Michigan Law Review
Volume 95

Issue 5

1997

Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Steven C. Seeger
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Legislation Commons,
Religion Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven C. Seeger, Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1472 (1997).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol95/iss5/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Steven

C.

Seeger

"[N]o liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the
free society which our Constitution guarantees than is the religious
liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause . . . "1
.

INTRODUCTION
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 19932 (the "RFRA,"
or the "Act") attempts to renew our national commitment to the
free exercise of religion. Beginning with the adoption of the com
pelling state interest test in 1963,3 the Supreme Court defended reli
gious freedom by strictly scrutinizing any government policy that
burdened a religious practice. The Court curtailed the protection
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause, however, in the 1990
landmark case of Employment Division, Department of Human Re
sources of Oregon v. Smith. 4 Under the Court's new standard of
review, the First Amendment no longer protects religious practices
that c o n flict with a " 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability.' "5
The Smith decision sparked a remarkable public outcry.6 An
ecumenical coalition of religious and secular organizations voiced
1. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result). The
First Amendment to the Constitution provides, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const.
amend. I.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to address
the constitutionality of the RFRA. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996). As this Note went to press, the Court's decision in Flores
was still pending.
3. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07. Under the compelling state interest test, the govern
ment must justify a law that burdens a religious practice by demonstrating that it furthers a
compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by a less restrictive means. See 374 U.S. at
406-407.
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). In the Court's view, excusing a religious individual from generally applicable
laws allows him to " 'become a law unto himself,' " Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)), which "contradicts both constitutional tradition
and common sense," Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. Our society would be "courting anarchy,'' the
Court observed, if the legal system continued to accommodate such religious exemptions.
See 494 U.S. at 888. In short, the Court held that accommodating religious objections to
generally applicable laws is a "luxury" that "we cannot afford." 494 U.S. at 888.
6. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
1472
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immediate opposition to the Court's new approach.7 With over
whelming bipartisan support,8 Congress responded by reinstating
the compelling state interest test through the RFRA.9
Despite this effort to restore religious freedom, the Act has not
fully achieved its remedial goals due to narrow judicial interpreta
tions of the substantial burden requirement.10 Tue statute requires
a claimant to establish that the government "substantially burCong. 64 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2797] (statement of Nadine Strossen, Presi
dent, American Civil Liberties Union) ("I do not recall such sustained and vigorous and
vitriolic criticism of a Supreme Court's decision in a constitutional law area by lower courts
. . . . Likewise, in terms of constitutional law professors, religious organizations, public inter
est organizations, this decision has deserved and received an unprecedented degree of criti
cism for departing so dramatically from traditional constitutional principles."). For a
compilation of more than 50 articles criticizing Smith, see The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Hearings on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 60-62 (1992)
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 2969] (provided by Oliver S. Thomas, on behalf of the Baptist
Joint Committee and the American Jewish Committee).
7. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the Sub
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong.
17 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5377] (statement of Rep. Solarz) (noting that the
broad coalition in support of the RFRA was " 'ecumenical' in both the political and religious
sense of that term"); see also 139 CoNG. REc. S14,469 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Bradley) ("It is a testament to the importance of RFRA that virtually every religious
group, spanning the entire spectrum, has voiced its support for this bill. It is a rare thing
when such a diverse coalition joins in wholehearted agreement."); 139 CONG. REc. S14,351
(daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting examples of groups that sup
ported the bill, including the National Association of Evangelicals, the Baptist Joint Commit
tee on Public Affairs, the American Civil Liberties Union, Concerned Women for America,
People for the American Way, the American Jewish Committee, and the U.S. Catholic
Conference).
8. See Hearings on H.R. 5377, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Rep. Solarz) ("It is per
haps not too hyperbolic to suggest that in the history of the Republic, there has rarely been a
bill which more closely approximates motherhood and apple pie than the legislation now
before you. In fact, I know, at least so far, of no one who opposes the legislation.").
9. The avowed purpose of the statute is "to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994) (parallel citations omitted). Congress recog
nized the value of religious freedom in the first line of the statute, finding that "the framers
of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its
protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(l) (1994).
Congress found that "governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification," and repudiated Smith for "virtually eliminat[ing] the requirement
that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3)-(4) (1994).
10. Perhaps courts fear the institutional consequences of accommodating the exercise of
religion. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem ofBurdens on the Free Exercise
of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989) ("Behind every free exercise claim is a spec
tral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an
endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe."); see also Note,
Burdens on the Free Exercise ofReligion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1258,
1259 (1989) ("The sheer number of different and unusual religions in the United States has
traditionally prompted judicial fears that an expansive reading of the free exercise clause
might paralyze government.").
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den[ed]" her exercise of religion.11 Once a claimant ·Satisfies this
requirement, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate
that the policy furthers a "compelling state interest" that cannot be
achieved by a less restrictive means.12
The emerging RFRA case law has yielded three different inter
pretations of the substantial burden requirement. One approach,
the "centrality test," requires a claimant to establish that the prac
tice in question is "central" to her religious beliefs.13 A related
standard, the "compulsion test," limits the RFRA to practices that
are religiously compelled.14 Under this test, a claimant must
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l{a) {1994) ("Government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.").
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994) ("Government may substantially burden a per
son's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
- (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental( interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
13. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits apply the centrality test. See Abdur-Rahman v. Michi
gan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 491-92 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding no substantial burden
because the practice was not "essential" or "fundamental" to the claimant's religion); Werner
v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) ("To exceed the 'substantial burden' thresh
old, government regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that
manifests some central tenet of a prisoner's individual beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a
prisoner's ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a prisoner reasonable
opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a prisoner's religion."
(citations omitted)); Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996) (observing that the
Werner approach equally applies to nonprisoners); see also Hall v. Griego, 896 F. Supp. 1043,
1047 (D. Colo. 1995); United States v. Jim, 888 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (D. Or. 1995).
The Eighth Circuit also appears to have adopted the centrality test. See Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996). The court ex
pressly repudiated the compulsion test, protecting tithing even though it was not required by
the claimants' religion. See Christians, 82 F.3d at 1418. The Court favorably quoted the
Tenth Circuit test, however, which requires a demonstration of centrality, and assumed for
purposes of analysis that courts can constitutionally determine "what beliefs are important or
fundamental, and whether a particular practice is of only minimal religious significance." 82
F.3d at 1418.
14. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits apply the compulsion test. See Goodall v. Stafford
County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no substantial burden because
the claimants "have neither been compelled to engage in conduct proscribed by their reli
gious beliefs, nor have they been forced to abstain from any action which their religion man
dates that they take"); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Davidson
v. Davis, No. 92 Ctv. 4040(SWK), 1995 WL 60732, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1995); Morris v.
Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 251 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
Although the centrality test and the compulsion test are theoretically distinct, courts fre
quently blur them together to form a hybrid standard. The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
fall into this category. See, e.g., Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 767-68 (3d Cir. 1996) (refer
ring both to centrality and compulsion); Hicks v. Gamer, 69 F.3d 22, 26 n.22 (5th Cir. 1995)
(same); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) ("In order to show a free exercise
violation using the 'substantial burden' test, 'the religious adherent . . . has the obligation to
prove that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of his or her religion
by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which
the faith mandates. This interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must
be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine.' "
(alterations in original) (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987)); see
also Crosley-El v. Berge, 896 F. Supp. 885, 887 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Rhinehart v. Gomez, No.
93-CV-3747, 1995 WL 364339, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 1995); Weir v. Nix, 890 F. Supp. 769,
.

•

•
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demonstrate that the government infringes upon a practice that is
mandated by her faith, or that the government requires the claim
ant to engage in conduct that is prohibited by her religion. A third
approach, the "religious motivation test," interprets the provision
more broadly: a claimant satisfies this standard by demonstrating
that the government infringes upon a practice that is motivated by
sincere religious belief.is
This Note argues that the religious motivation test best secures
the religious liberty guaranteed by the Constitution and the RFRA.
Part I examines the text and legislative history of the Act and estab
lishes that Congress intended to protect religiously motivated prac
tices. Part II argues that the free exercise case law prior to Smith,
to which the RFRA explicitly appeals, did not require litigants to
prove centrality or compulsion. Part III demonstrates that the reli
gious motivation test protects the full spectrum of religious prac
tices and religious groups, unlike the centrality test and the
compulsion test. Part IV illustrates that the motivation test, unlike
competing approaches, does not require courts to make judgments
that exceed the bounds of their capacity and their· authority. This
Note concludes that a claimant who demonstrates a government in
fringement of a religiously motivated practice satisfies the substan
tial burden requirement of the RFRA.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION THROUGH TEXT AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

l.

This Part examines the text and legislative history of the RFRA,
and concludes that Congress intended to protect practices that are
783 (S.D. Iowa 1995); Tinsley v. San Francisco, No. C 95-0667 EFL, 1995 WL 302445, at *l
(N.D. Cal. May 11, 1995).
15. See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1443-44 (W.D. Wis. 1995) petition for
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3370 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1996) (No. 96-710); Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp.
215, 217-18 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Muslim v. Frame, 891 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("Thus, a
plaintiffs burden under RFRA is satisfied by a showing that the government has placed a
substantial burden on a practice motivated by a sincere religious belief.").
The Second Circuit's explanation of the substantial burden requirement makes no men
tion of centrality or compulsion, and would appear to encompass religiously motivated prac
tices. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476-77 {2d Cir. 1996) ("Our scrutiny extends only to
whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular belief and whether the belief is religious in
nature
[A] substantial burden exists where the state 'put[s] substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.' " (second alteration in original)
(quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981))).
The Seventh Circuit interprets the RFRA to cover religiously motivated practices, but
adopts a test that also reflects vestiges of centrality. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179
(7th Cir. 1996) ("[A] substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, within the meaning
of the Act, is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated
conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet of a per
son's religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.");
see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 1996) (protecting the "religiously
motivated" decision to wear a crucifix while in prison, even though wearing such jewelry was
not "required" by the claimant's religion).
.

•

.
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motivated by sincere religious beliefs. Section I.A argues that the
broad language of the Act manifests an intention to cover all forms
of religious exercise. Section I.B explores the congressional discus
sions of the bill, and demonstrates that Congress expected that the
statute would protect religious practices irrespective of compulsion
or centrality.
A.

The Plain Meaning of the Provisions

The text of the RFRA provides a natural point of departure for
an interpretation of the substantial burden requirement.16 The stat
ute provides that the " [g]overnment shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability."17 The drafters incorporated only one ex16. See Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 830 (1983) ("As with any issue of statu·
tory construction, we ' "must begin with the language of the statute itself." ' " (footnote omit·
ted) (quoting Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) (quoting
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187 {1980)))).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994). On its face, the text appears to separate a "substan
tial burden" from a claimant's "exercise of religion." Hence, one would expect that courts
would engage in two distinct inquiries: first, whether the government policy constituted a
substantial burden; and second, whether the claimant's activity constituted an exercise of
religion. In other words, a claimant might fail to present a prima facie case, either because
the government action did not sufficiently impair the claimant's religious activity, or because
the claimant's practice did not amount to an exercise of religion under the Act.
Courts that impose a third requirement-demonstrating centrality or compulsion-do so
under the substantial burden prong of the Act. Under the centrality and compulsion tests,
courts find that a claimant has not suffered a "substantial burden" unless the government
action is sufficiently invasive, and unless the religious practice in question is central or com
pelled, respectively. See, e.g., Lewis v. Scott, 910 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Tex. 1995) ("In
weighing whether a particular regulation constitutes a substantial burden, other circuits have
looked both to the degree of burden placed on an individual and the centrality of the particu
lar practice burdened . . . .") .
Such courts create unnecessary confusion by linking "substantial burden" with notions of
centrality and compulsion. Rather than concluding that claimants do not suffer a substantial
burden if the practice is noncentral or noncompulsory, it would seem more natural, and more
consistent with the statutory text, for such courts to conclude that noncentral and noncom
pulsory practices do not amount to an "exercise of religion" under the Act. Put another way,
if the statute only protects central or compelled practices, as certain courts maintain, then it
would appear sensible to conclude that noncentral and noncompelled practices do not consti
tute an "exercise of religion" covered by the RFRA, as opposed to concluding that the gov
ernment policy does not impose a substantial burden.
A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose that a local government passed a gener
ally applicable ordinance that forbade the creation of new homeless shelters in a downtown
area. Claimant A, for sake of argument, views caring for the homeless as a central part of her
religion; Claimant B considers the same activity to be motivated by his religion, but does not
believe that such conduct is central to his faith. Under the centrality test, the government
policy might constitute a substantial burden with respect to Claimant A, but not as to Claim
ant B, because the latter individual does not claim a burden upon a central religious practice.
A court might reach this result in spite of the fact that the same government policy - the
prohibition of new shelters - equally applies to each of the two believers. Rather than
holding that the government policy is burdensome with respect to Claimant A, but not as to
Claimant B, it would appear more direct for such courts to conclude that the burden upon
each claimant is equal, but that the noncentral religious practice of Claimant B is not an
"exercise of religion" under the RFRA.
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ception to this blanket rule: the state may substantially burden an
exercise of religion only if the policy or program furthers a "com
pelling governmental interest" and is the "least restrictive means"
of furthering that interest.18 Thus, if a claimant establishes a sub
stantial burden upon her religious practice, the government must
satisfy the compelling state interest test, or else the statute entitles
the claimant to "appropriate relief."19
The words of the statute inform the present debate in two im
portant respects. First, the RFRA extends to the full range of reli
gious conduct that received protection under the Free Exercise
Clause in the pre Smi th era. Congress ensured that the RFRA
would apply to the same spectrum of religious conduct by defining
"exercise of religion"20 by reference to the Free Exercise Clause:
"exercise of religion" means "the exercise of religion under the
First Amendment to the Constitution."21 This definition reveals
that the RFRA protects religiously motivated practices to the ex
tent that such conduct received protection under the Constitution
in the years leading up to Smith. In short, RFRA claimants do not
need to demonstrate centrality or compulsion if the Court did not
impose such requirements in the pre Smith case law.22
Second, the absence of restrictive language in the texf of the
RFRA suggests that Congress intended to provide broad protection
for religion.23 On its face, the text manifests no intention on the
-

-

In short, whether the government imposes a substantial burden should not tum on
whether the believer views the practice to be central or compelled; it should only tum on the
level of hardship that the government imposes on the claimant's religious practice.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(l)-(2) (1994).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (1994). Declaratory and injunctive relief represent the
most common remedies under the RFRA.
20. Whether the conduct in question is religious, as opposed to nonreligious, is an issue
that must be resolved under any of these three interpretations of the RFRA. For a discussion
of what constitutes a "religion" for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA, see
James M. Donovan, God is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of "Reli
gion, " 6 SETON HALL CoNsr. LJ. 23 (1995); Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An
Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 309 (1994); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided
Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEo. L.J. 1519 (1983); Douglas
Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuES 313 (1996).
21. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994).
22. For a discussion of the pre-Smith case law, see infra Part II.
23. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the religious
motivation test "is more faithful both to the statutory language and to the approach that the
courts took before Smith"); Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215, 218 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("[T]he
text of RFRA ... protects 'the free exercise of religion.' . . . [T]his phrase refers to particular
practices which are religious in nature. Such practices are not limited to those deemed to be
compulsory by religious doctrine."); Muslim v. Frame, 891 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
("This language in no way suggests that the right to free exercise is limited to exercises judi
cially deemed central to the plaintiffs religion."); see also Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Con
gress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L.
REv. 1, 54 (1994) ("Simple textualism strongly argues against limiting RFRA's protection
only to religious conduct implicating doctrinal 'commands or prohibitions.' ").
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part of Congress to cabin the statute to narrow subcategories of
religious conduct. Tue Act extends to a person's "exercise of reli
gion," a category of conduct that would appear to encompass all
religious activities.24 If Congress intended to protect only central or
compelled practices, the drafters easily could have inserted lan
guage to reflect this crucial limitation. Yet Congress bypassed the
opportunity to limit the scope of the Act, choosing rather to employ
inclusive language that reveals no inherent restrictions. Tue ab
sence of restrictive language in the statutory text supports the con
clusion that Congress did not intend to confine the RFRA to
central or compelled practices.25
B.

Legislative History

Tue legislative history of the RFRA reveals that Congress ex
pected the statute to apply to all religiously motivated practices.
Section I.B.1 demonstrates that Congress specifically rejected the
compulsion test as an overly restrictive interpretation of the statute.
Section I.B.2 argues that the examples of impermissible burdens
discussed during the hearings illustrate that the RFRA does not re
quire a demonstration of centrality.
1.

The Compulsion Test

Tue legislative history indicates that a claimant may satisfy her
burden without demonstrating that the practice is compelled by her
religion.26 While considering the bill, Congress discussed the com24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (1994); see also Laycock, supra note 20, at 337 ("[T]he
text [of the Constitution] affirmatively supports the interpretation of guaranteeing as much
liberty as possible to holders of all views about religion."); Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics,
and the Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 407, 412 (1996) ("The 'exercise' of religion
comprises many different but related kinds of religious practice, including: public affirmation
of religious beliefs; affiliation, based on shared religious beliefs, with a church or other reli
gious group; worship and study animated by religious beliefs; the proselytizing dissemination
of religious beliefs or other religious information; and moral choices, or even a whole way of
life, guided by religious beliefs.").
25. Moreover, the Court's traditional approach toward remedial statutes weighs in favor
of the motivation test. A "standard of liberal construction" applies to statutes that confer
new rights or benefits, in order to effectuate the beneficent goals of Congress. See, e.g.,
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987) (quoting Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949)) (construing the Federal Employers' Liability Act);
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1982) (construing Title VII). This
principle of statutory construction supports an interpretation of the Act that reaches reli
giously motivated practices. The RFRA is a classic example of a remedial statute: its specific
purpose is to increase protection for the exercise of religion by restoring the compelling state
interest test. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) (1994). Congress recognized that religious free
dom was in jeopardy, and that legislative action was necessary in order to restore the balance.
A court can advance the goals of the RFRA and follow this accepted approach to remedial
statutes by construing the Act to extend to practices that are motivated by religion.
26. See Berg, supra note 23, at 55 ("Eliminating protection for all claims not rooted in a
religious 'command or prohibition' would undermine some of the central concerns of the
Act."); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 145, 150-51
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pulsion test because of the Act's perceived effect upon abortion
rights. The House conducted subcommittee hearings on the bill in
May of 1992, on the eve of the Court's decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 27 which reaffirmed the constitutional right to
an abortion. Reflecting uncertainty over the future o� Roe v.
Wade,2B prolife members of Congress voiced concern that the
RFRA could provide a statutory basis for the right to an abortion if
the Court overturned Roe.29
Profile members of 'Congress initially expressed reservations
about the bill because they believed that it would cover religiously
motivated practices.30 Representative Hyde and others observed

that the bill would not be limited to compulsory conduct, but would
extend to practices motivated by religion.31 James Bopp, J r., Gen
eral Counsel to the National Right to Life Committee, shared the
reservations of the prolife members, and voiced concern over the
broad scope of the bill:
[T]he primaryscholarlychampions of the bill insist that the RFRA
must be interpreted as applicable to religious motivation,not just reli
gious compulsion. . . . Given that the RFRA no where defines the
phrase "burden a person's exercise of religion"and that it[ ]s schol
arlyproponents call for a "motivated byreligion"interpretation,it is
doubtless that a court called upon to make the decision of whether
the RFRAreaches religious motivation would find that it does.32
The possible ramifications of an expansive statute were not lost on
the prolife community: a law that protected religiously motivated
conduct might also protect religiously motivated abortions. Profile
participants thus advocated, without success, an amendment to the
{1995) ("[B]oth the opponents and proponents of the original bill agreed that the standard is
simply that religion be the principal motivation for the conduct. . . . The legislative history is
clear that the conduct does not have to be compelled by religion."); Douglas Laycock &
Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 209,
232 {1994) ("In both the House and Senate hearings, supporters and opponents agreed that
the bill would protect conduct that was religiously 'motivated.' ").
27. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a woman's right to an abortion.
29. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 7-8 (statement of Rep. Hyde). Inter
est in this issue did not fade even after Casey: participants in the Senate hearings also dis
cussed how the RFRA might affect future restrictions on abortion. See, e.g., Hearings on S.
2969, supra note 6, at 203-04 (statement of James Bopp, Jr., general counsel, National Right
to Life Committee, Inc.).
30. See Robert F. Drinan, S.J. & Jennifer I. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: A Legislative History, 10 J.L. & REuomN 531, 536-37 {1993-94) ("[T]he primary focus
of the critics' concerns regarding the RFRA was abortion-related. Of particular concern was
whether the bill protected only acts 'compelled' by a religious belief or tqose 'motivated' by
religious belief.").
31. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 135-36.
32. Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 220-21 (statement of James Bopp, Jr.); Hearings
on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 284-85 (statement of James Bopp, Jr.).
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bill that would have restricted the RFRA to compelled religious
practices.33
Addressing these concerns about the scope of the bill, Repre
sentative Solarz, the chief sponsor,34 confirmed that the RFRA
would protect religiously motivated practices. During the hearings,
Hyde directly asked whether the statute would cover practices that
are religiously motivated, or only those that are religiously com
pelled.35 Solarz responded, "I would be reluctant to limit it to ac
tions compelled by religion, as distinguished from actions which are
motivated by a sincere belief."36
Hoping to keep the legislative history "as clear as possible,"37
Solarz submitted an explanatory letter to the subcommittee follow
ing his testimony.38 Solarz revealed that the drafters of the bill in
tended to avoid two extremes. On the one hand, they did not want
33. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 285 (statement of James Bopp, Jr.) ("Sup
porters of the RFRA could, of course, easily resolve this problem by inserting 'compelled by'
language in the RFRA."); see also Laycock, supra note 26, at 151 ("Congress rejected the
view that only religious compulsion is protected. In committee hearings, lobbyists offered
amendments to change to a compulsion standard, but those amendments went nowhere.").
Opponents of an abortion amendment did not deny that the Act would protect religiously
motivated practices, but questioned the likelihood that the RFRA would restore the right to
an abortion if Roe were overturned. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 119 (state
ment of Rep. Solarz) ("(I]f, in fact, the Supreme Court does rescind or repeal Roe v. Wade, it
is virtually inconceivable that the very same Court would then tum around and, on free
exercise grounds, reinstate the right to have an abortion
").
34. Hyde noted that the views of Solarz, the chief sponsor, would be critical when deter
mining the intent of Congress. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 136 (statement of
Rep. Hyde).
35. See id.
36. Id. (statement of Rep. Solarz). Solarz conceded that the bill protected religiously
motivated practices, but took issue with Hyde's description of the motivation test. Hyde
feared that the motivation standard would cover any conduct that was consistent with one's
faith. See id. at 136 (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("All of this stuff about being compelled is
really beside the point. It is, someone who says my religion nudges me toward - I think it is
compatible with my religion to have an abortion. That is motivated. And that is protected by
your bill."). Solarz laid these fears to rest in his testimony and in his letter to the subcommit·
tee: the RFRA would not apply to conduct which is merely "consistent" with one's religious
beliefs. See id. at 128-30, 136 {letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards,
and statement of Rep. Solarz). The meaning of the motivation test received the attention of
other witnesses during the hearings. See id. at 372 (statement of Douglas Laycock, professor,
University of Texas School of Law) ("Now, what would the woman have to show about her
individual religious beliefs? She has to say that her desire for abortion is compelled by or at
least motivated by her religion. Now, what does motivated mean? It means because of her
religion. . . . Religion has to be the reason for her abortion."); Hearings on S. 2969, supra note
6, at 42 (statement of Oliver S. Thomas, general counsel, Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs) ("RFRA protects conduct only when religion is the primary cause or reason for the
conduct. It is not enough that religion contributes to a decision that is made largely for
secular reasons."); see also Laycock, supra note 26, at 151 ("What comes through in the
legislative history is that compulsion is not required and motivation is sufficient, but religion
has to be the dominant or the principal motivation.").
37. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 128 {letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep.
Solarz to Rep. Edwards).
38. See id. at 128-30 (Jetter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards).
.

.

.

•
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to limit the RFRA to practices that are compelled by religious be
lief. 39 Confining the legislation to mandatory conduct would "run
the risk of excluding practices which are generally believed to be
exercises of religion worthy of protection."4 0 Solarz offered
noncompulsory prayer as an example of an "unmistakable exercise
of religion" that the drafters intended to protect, but which would
remain unprotected under the compulsion test.4 1 At the same time,
the drafters did not want to include conduct that is only "consistent
with" one's faith.42 Searching for language to capture the middle
ground between "compelled" and "consistent," Solarz selected the
word "motivated" in an initial draft of the bill.43 Although the ge
neric phrase "exercise of religion" eventually became the statutory
standard,44 one conclusion seems clear: the sponsors of the bill ex39. See id.; id. at 129 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards)
(" '[l]t would be a mistake to tighten the language of the Act by confining it to conduct
"compelled by" religious belief.' " (quoting letter dated Feb. 21, 1991, from Michael W. Mc
Connell, professor, University of Chicago Law School, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, dean, Val
paraiso Law School, and Douglas Laycock, professor, University of Texas School of Law, to
Reps. Solarz and Henry)).
40. Id. at 129; see also Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 46 (statement of Oliver S.
Thomas) ("[A] law that protects only religiously compelled acts would exclude many acts
that are obviously religious. Most believers seek to do more than the bare minimum that
God requires. Is prayer compelled? Only on occasion.. . . Is serving as a minister com
pelled? Not always. These acts would not be protected by the compulsion test. Clearly, they
should be protected, and are, by RFRA.'').
41. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 129 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep.
Solarz to Rep. Edwards).
42. See id. at 129-30 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards) ("To
say that the 'exercise of religion' might include acts not necessarily compelled by a sincerely
held religious belief is not to say that any act merely consistent with, or not proscribed [by]
one's religion would be an exercise of religion.''). Solarz provided the following example:
the RFRA would not protect the right to brandish a machine gun if the claimant merely
asserted that the bearing of arms was compatible with his religious beliefs. Id. at 130 (letter
dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards).
43. See id. at 128-29 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards).
44. Solarz revealed that he included "motivated" in an earlier draft of the bill, but re
moved the word because it began to generate "more heat than light.'' Id. at 128 (letter dated
June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards). Viewed in isolation, the removal of "mo
tivated" from the text of the statute might suggest that the drafters intended to exclude relig
iously motivated practices from the protection of the RFRA. When considered in the
context of the remainder of the letter, however, this alteration represents an attempt to avoid
confusing the judiciary, rather than a limitation on the scope of the statute.
Solarz remarked that " '[i]t is difficult to capture the idea of the dictates of conscience in
statutory language.' " Id. at 129 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Ed
wards) quoting letter from Professor McConnell et al. to Reps. Solarz and Henry. Given that
the pre-Smith case law was not " 'limited to any particular verbal formula in describing what
constitutes a religious exercise for First Amendment purposes,' " the drafters decided that it
would be appropriate to employ a generic standard in the text of the statute. Id. (quoting the
Congressional Research Service); see also id. at 131 (statement of the Congressional Re
search Service). Solarz concluded that "the term 'free exercise of religion,' used by the draft
ers of the First Amendment, most accurately described what I hoped to protect through
passage of RFRA.'' Id. at 128 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Ed
wards). Utilizing the broad language of the First Amendment would give courts "enough
flexibility to protect the exercises of different religions on an equal, case-by-case basis," id. at
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plicitly rejected the compulsion test because it would provide insuf
ficient protection for the exercise of religion.4s
2.

The Centrality Test

Unfortunately, Congress did not reveal its view of the centrality
test in such transparent terms. The subcommittee debates did not
address directly whether the bill would protect only the central
practices of one's faith. Representative Solarz provided the closest
thing to a statement on this issue, expressing the expectation that
courts would not dissect religious doctrine when deciding cases
under the RFRA: "Even the independent judiciary has been care
ful to inquire only into the nature and sincerity of an individual's
religious belief on a case-by-case basis, avoiding broader inquiries
into a particular denomination's doctrine, or the nature of religion
generally."46 Apart from this general observation, the record does
not include an express instruction on the issue of centrality.
Courts are not left without direction, however, when construing
the RFRA. For instance, one might infer from congressional dis
cussions of the compulsion test that the Act does not require a dem
onstration of centrality. Statements indicating that the RFRA
would protect religiously motivated conduct naturally support the
conclusion that Congress intended to protect all practices within
this classification. In other words, it would be curious for Congress
to state that the proposed statute would protect religiously moti
vated practices if Congress simultaneously intended to limit the
statute to religiously motivated practices that are also "central." In
the absence of a statement to the contrary,47 it appears that Con129, and would provide a "useful framework for application of the Act" by employing a term
"sufficiently familiar to the courts," id. at 130. In short, the drafters did not believe that
Congress could "do any better than the Framers of the Bill of Rights when they chose to
protect the 'free exercise of religion' and leave its definition to the independent judiciary on a
case-by-case basis." Id.
Thus understood, the drafters removed "motivated" in order to avoid confusion: courts
might misconstrue a departure from the language of the First Amendment as a signal that the
statute extends to a different range of religious conduct. By incorporating the familiar lan
guage of the Constitution, the drafters communicated that the statute covers the religious
activities that received protection under the First Amendment in the years preceding Smith.
Although the text of the RFRA does not specifically use the word "motivated," religiously
motivated practices receive protection under the RFRA to the same extent that such prac
tices enjoyed protection in the pre-Smith case law.
This conclusion seems all the more reasonable when one considers that the letter repudi
ates the compulsion test, which would deny protection to religiously motivated practices, in
no uncertain terms. See sources cited supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
45. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 128-30 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from
Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards).
46. Id. at 130 (statement of Rep. Solarz).
47. The record reveals no intention to limit the scope of the Act to practices that are
central to the adherent's faith.
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gress intended to protect all practices that are motivated by reli
gion, irrespective of centrality or compulsion.

In addition, one can glean guidance from the examples provided
during the congressional discussions of the bill. Advocates demon
strated the need for the RFRA by appealing to concrete examples
- instances when the government had infringed upon the right to
the free exercise of religion.4 8 Members offered examples with the
express expectation that the RFRA would provide a remedy in such
situations.49 By providing these examples, supporters of the bill re
vealed their assumptions that the Act would extend to the religious
practices under discussion: the RFRA could "make a difference" in
a given case only if the state imposed a cognizable burden upon a
practice covered by the Act. An examination of these examples
thus yields a sense of the types of practices Congress intended to
protect under the RFRA.
The examples indicate that Congress did not intend to limit the
Act to central religious practices. Supporters of the bill highlighted
the need for corrective legislation by citing dozens of actual and
potential violations of religious liberty.5 0 Nadine Strossen of the
American Civil Liberties Union provided a typical litany of prac
tices that remained vulnerable without the RFRA:
In the aftermath of the Smithdecision ...[a]t risk were such fa
miliar practices as the sacramental use of wine,kosher slaughter,the
sanctityof the confessional,religious preferences in church hiring,es
tablishing places of worship in areas zoned for other use,permitting
religiouslysponsored hospitals to decline to provide abortion or con
traception services, sex segregation during worship services, exemp
tions from mandatoryretirement[ ] la ws,a church's refusal to ordain
women or homosexuals,exemptions from landmark and zoning regu
lations,and the inapplicabilityof highlyintrusive educational rules to
parochial schools.st
48. Cf. Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Oliver S. Thomas) ("Since
Smith was decided, governments throughout the U.S. have run roughshod over religious
conviction.").
49. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 18 (statement of Rep. Solarz); id. at 70
(statement of the Anti-Defamation League); id. at 361-71 (statement of Prof. Laycock); see
also Laycock & Thomas, supra note 26, at 229.
50. Professor Laycock offered pages of cases decided after Smith in order to illustrate the
need for remedial legislation. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 361-71; see also
Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 50-58 (containing a summary of post-Smith cases com
piled by J. Brent Walker).
51. Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 192 (statement of Nadine Strossen); see also
Hearings on H.R. 5377, supra note 7, at 23 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) ("Without the
restoration of the 'compelling interest' standard, all religious activity is at risk. Government
employees could be forced to work on religious holidays like Yorn Kippur; Catholic children
could be prevented from taking wine for communion because they are under the legal drink
ing age; individuals could be denied the right to pray for healing; Moslems, whose religion
mandates ritual slaughter, could be unable to obtain religiously sanctioned food; people, in
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Supporters of the bill offered many other prominent examples:
forcing the Amish to display bright orange reflectors on their bug
gies,5 2 interfering with worship by landmarking the interior of a
church,53 and shutting down a religious homeless shelter for failure
to install an elevator to the second floor.54
When considering these examples, one is struck both by the
wide range of conduct and by the sheer number of practices that
Congress intended to protect. On their face, the examples appear
to represent ordinary instances of religiously motivated conduct.
The record provides no indication that these practices would be
considered central, nor that they must be considered central in or
der to receive protection.55 Given the broad spectrum of religious
practices discussed in the hearings, and the absence of any indica
tion that these practices were or needed to be considered central, it
seems reasonable to conclude that Congress did not foresee a cen
trality requirement for the RFRA. Through these examples, Con
gress expressed a quiet but distinct expectation that the RFRA
would offer broad protection for religious practices regardless of
their centrality to the individual believer.
II.

THE FREE EXERCISE CASE LAW

Cases construing the Free Exercise Clause also provide valuable
instruction to courts that interpret the RFRA. In the decades pre
ceding Smith, the Court applied the compelling state interest test
when claimants established a burden upon the practice of their reli
gion. Smith introduced a new era of free exercise jurisprudence,
abandoning the strict scrutiny test in cases challenging generally ap
plicable laws that are facially neutral toward religion. The RFRA
represents a bold attempt to return to the status quo ante. The Act
aims to "restore" religious freedom by reintroducing the compelling
state interest test when individuals challenge governmental action
that burdens religious conduct. Congress explicitly recognized the
jurisprudential roots of the statute, and expected that courts would
look to prior case law for guidance when construing the Act.56 As a
fact, could be prevented from reading religious literature in public places. This list could go
on and on. Clearly, every American's personal freedom is at stake.").
S2. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 18 (statement of Robert P. Dugan, Jr.,
director, office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals).
S3. See id. at 122 (statement of Rep. Solarz).
S4. See id. at 149 (statement of Dean Gaffney).
SS. See Laycock, supra note 26, at 1S2 ("What emerges from these examples is that reli
gious exercise is substantially burdened if religious institutions or religiously motivated con
duct is burdened, penalized, or discouraged." (emphasis added)).
S6. Congress expressly invoked the prior case law in the text of the statute. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994) ("[T]he term 'exercise of religion' means
the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution."). The committee
reports likewise revealed a clear intention to subject the statute to the approach developed in
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consequence, the pre-Smith case law plays a major role when inter
preting the requirements of the RFRA.
The pre-Smith case law reveals that the Court has never re
stricted the Free Exercise Clause to central or compelled practices.
Since the introduction of the strict scrutiny test, the Court has ad
dressed an array of religious practices brought by believers of di
verse faiths. Although the Court has found a cognizable burden in
a number of cases, the Court has not resorted to any single formula
tion of words to describe a religious practice burdened by the gov
ernment.57 Instead, the opinions repeatedly draw attention to the
religious nature of the conduct, and characterize the underlying
religious activities in broad and inclusive terms. The cases thus fo
cus upon government interference with the exercise of religious
scruples, without dissecting claimants' religious beliefs to determine
if the practice is central or compelled.
To be sure, some cases observe that the religious practice in
question was central to the beliefs of the claimant, while other cases
mention the mandatory nature of the religious conduct. Yet, the
fact remains that the Court has never required that the claimant
establish either centrality or compulsion in order to receive protec
tion under the First Amendment.58 On the contrary, the opinions
indicate that a claimant may satisfy her burden by demonstrating
the cases preceding Smith. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993) ("The committee expects that
the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining
whether the exercise of religion has been substantially burdened . . . ."); H.R. REP. No. 10388, at 6-7 (1993) ("It is the Committee's expectation that the courts will look to free exercise
of religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether or not religious
exercise has been burdened . . . ."). The reports also indicated, however, that the RFRA
must not be construed as a Congressional sanction of any prior case in particular. See S. REP.
No. 103-111, at 9 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 7 (1993).
57. See Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of
Legislative Power, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 247, 271 (1994).
58. As for "compulsion," Representative Solarz asked the Congressional Research Ser
vice to determine "whether the exercise of religion has been deemed by the Court to be
limited to actions that are compelled by religious beliefs or has been more inclusive." Hear
ings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 131 (statement of the Congressional Research Service).
The Service responded: "The cases indicate that the Court, although frequently finding the
religious practice in question to have been compelled or commanded by religious belief, has
not been limited to any particular verbal formula in describing what constitutes a religious
exercise for First Amendment purposes." Id. Further, Professor Tribe has argued that the
Court has never required a demonstration of centrality. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 1247 (2d ed. 1988) ("The magnitude of the religious
burdens is often stated in terms of the centrality of the tenet to the believer's faith; however,
'centrality' only partially describes the courts' inquiry. True, centrality does help explain
some holdings, and the Supreme Court in Sherbert and especially in Yoder emphasized the
centrality of the burdened beliefs. However, the Court has never specifically required free
exercise claimants to demonstrate that the state requirement burden a central tenet of their
beliefs." (citations omitted)); see also Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215, 219 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
("Supreme Court case law before Smith, to which RFRA specifically directs courts to look
for guidance . . . did not present a single formulation as to the types of practices covered by
the Free Exercise Clause.").
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that the government violated the claimant's exercise of religion,
without regard to centrality or compulsion.
Section I.A reviews the two cases specifically cited in the
RFRA; section LB examines the string of unemployment compen
sation cases, in which the Court repeatedly found cognizable bur
dens; section I.C discusses the last few cases leading up to Smith,
which include an express repudiation of the centrality test.
A.

The Foundational Cases

The two cases cited in the text of the RFRA, Sherbert v. Ver
ner59 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 60 introduce this discussion of the Free
Exercise case law. These precedents support the conclusion that
the First Amendment protects religiously motivated conduct re
gardless of whether the practice is central or compelled.
In Sherbert, the Court confronted a denial of government bene
fits based on a person's religious beliefs. As a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church, Adell Sherbert devoutly observed
Saturday as the Sabbath Day of her faith.61 When her employer
changed to a six-day work week, Ms. Sherbert adhered to her reli
gious principles, and subsequently lost her job. The state adminis
trative agency denied her request for unemployment compensation
benefits, finding that she had refused employment opportunities
"without good cause."62

In the view of the Court, it was "clear" that the denial of bene
fits constituted a burden on the free exercise of the claimant's reli
gion.63 The Court began its explanation with a general statement
about the Free Exercise Clause: a law imposes a cognizable burden
" '[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of
one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between reli
gions.' "64 Turning to the particular experience of Adell Sherbert,
the Court cast the burden in terms of a Robson's choice: "The rul
ing forces her to choose between following the precepts of her reli
gion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand."65 The Court concluded that this between-a-rock-and-a
hard-place scenario constituted a "substantial infringement" of her
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
See 374 U.S. at 401.
See 374 U.S. at 403.
64. 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
65. 374 U.S. at 404; cf. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he issue
in this case . . . is whether a State may put an individual to a choice between his business and
his religion.").
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First Amendment rights,66 comparable to a fine on those who wor
ship on Saturday.67
The several opinions in this case reflect an inclusive approach
toward religion, describing Ms. Sherbert's conduct in the broadest
of terms.68 In the words of the majority, the First Amendment cov
ers .!;;tcts prompted by religious beliefs or principles."69 The plain
tiff {�adily satisfied this standard by demonstrating that her refusal
to work on Saturday sprang from her "conscientious scruples,"70
and from her "religious convictions respecting the day of rest. "71
The Court referred broadly to the "precepts of her religion,"72 with
out suggesting that only certain types of religious practices would
be eligible for protection. The opinions filed by other Justices
echoed the majority, describing the exercise of her religion in gen
eral terms. The concurring opinions observed that Ms. Sherbert's
refusal to work on Saturdays was "based on the tenets of her reli
gious faith,"73 and that her "religious scruples" prompted her deci
sion.74 "The harm," Justice Douglas observed, "is the interference
66. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
67. See 374 U.S. at 404.
68. Despite a number of references to the broad protection afforded by the Constitution,
some courts have interpreted Sherbert narrowly on the basis of two passages in the majority
opinion. At the outset of the opinion, the Court acknowledged that the prohibition against
Saturday labor "is a basic tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist creed." 374 U.S. at 399 n.1. In
a later passage, the Court observed that the state had penalized the free exercise of the
claimant's constitutional liberties by conditioning the receipt of benefits upon her willingness
to violate a "cardinal principle of her religious faith." 374 U.S. at 406. Some courts have
inferred from these passages that the Free Exercise Clause only protects central religious
practices. See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-1, 942 F. Supp. 511, 516 (W.D.
Okla. 1996); Lewis v. Scott, 910 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
It is noteworthy, however, that no reference to centrality appears when the Court ad
dressed the crucial inquiry: "[W]hether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden
on the free exercise of appellant's religion." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. In the primary pas
sage discussing cognizable burdens, the Court made no reference to the centrality of the
claimant's religious practice, and provided no indication that the practice could not enjoy
constitutional protection unless it was central to her religion. See 374 U.S. at 403-04. If the
Court intended to restrict the Free Exercise Clause to central religious practices, one would
expect that the Court would communicate this restriction in its discussion of cognizable bur
dens. The absence of any reference to centrality in this passage casts doubt upon the conclu
sion that the Court in Sherbert restricted the Free Exercise Clause to central religious
practices.
Viewed in this context, the two aforementioned references to the claimant's religion are
best understood in descriptive terms: The Court observed that the state burdened a funda
mental religious practice, but did not intend to establish centrality as a constitutional
requirement.
69. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. The implication from this passage is that the First Amend
ment protects conduct "prompted" by religious belief, unless the state can establish a com
pelling interest in regulation.
70. See 374 U.S. at 399.
71. 374 U.S. at 410.
72. See 374 U.S. at 404.
73. 374 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
74. See 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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with the individual's scruples or conscience . . . . "75 The dissenters
also recognized that the Court's holding affected "those whose be
havior is religiously motivated," including Adell Sherbert.76 These
open-ended references to the plaintiff's religious conduct suggest
that the Constitution affords broad protection to practices that are
motivated by sincere religious beliefs.
The other seminal case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 71 provides further
guidance about the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. Yoder ad
dressed a compulsory school-attendance statute that required all
Wisconsin children to go to school until the age of sixteen.1s As
members of the Old Order Amish community, the Yoder family
objected to formal education beyond the eighth grade on religious
grounds.79
The Yoders convincingly demonstrated that the state had in
fringed upon the exercise of their religious beliefs. The family be
longed to a conservative Amish community that emphasized
separation from secular society.so The Yoders established that com
pliance with the school attendance statute would impose a serious
barrier to the integration of the children into the Amish commu
nity.s1 Forcing the children to undergo formalized education be
yond the eighth grade would also jeopardize the family's standing in
the community, threaten the survival of the Old Order Amish soci
ety, and endanger the eternal salvation of the family.82
Again employing inclusive language, the Court found that the
family's way of life was "rooted in religious belief."83 The Yoders'
separatist lifestyle was not a matter of personal preference, the
Court observed, but rather stemmed from "deep religious convic
tion."84 In the Court's view, the record abundantly supported the
claim that additional years of education would be "contrary to the
Amish religion. "85
75. 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring).
76. 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
78. See 406 U.S. at 207-09.
79. The school district administrator filed suit when the Yoders refused to send their chil
dren, ages fourteen and fifteen, to public school. Rejecting the constitutional challenge, the
county court convicted the parents of violating the statute and imposed a nominal fine. See'
406 U.S. at 207-08.
80. See 406 U.S. at 209-10.
81. See 406 U.S. at 211-12.
82. See 406 U.S. at 209, 212.
83. See 406 U.S. at 215.
84. See 406 U.S. at 216. A "deep" religious conviction is not necessarily synonymous with
a central religious practice. For example, a believer might have a deep religious conviction
that abortion is wrong, but might picket outside of abortion clinics without viewing such
activity as a "central" religious practice.
85. 406 U.S. at 209.
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Admittedly, the Court repeatedly observed that nonconform
ance with secular society was central to the Yoders' religious be
liefs. The Court noted that the concept of separation from the
world was "central to their faith,"86 and that the objection to com
pulsory education was "firmly grounded in these central religious
concepts."87 The "fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs"
would be violated if the state forced Amish parents to surrender
their teenaged children to formalized education.88
Despite these repeated references to the centrality of the con
duct, several factors suggest that Yoder did not establish centrality
as an essential element of a Free Exercise claim. First, although the
Court noted that Wisconsin infringed upon a central religious prac. tice, the Court offered no indication that practices needed to be cen
tral in order to receive protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
Standing alone, references to the centrality of the Yoders' beliefs
fail to establish centrality as a constitutional requirement. Other
passages in the opinion illustrate the point. For example, the ma
jority mentioned no less than five times that the compulsory educa
tion statute threatened the very existence of the Old Order Amish
community.89 Yet, few people would infer from these passages that
the Constitution protects individual believers only if the state action
endangers the future of their religious group. The Court made an
equal number of references to the fact that the Amish practice of
separation had persisted for several centuries,90 but it would not be
sensible to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause applies only to
religions with such an established heritage. In similar fashion, by
observing that the state burdened a central religious practice, the
Court did not thereby restrict the First Amendment to the exercise
of central religious beliefs. The fact that the state burdened a cen
tral religious practice in Yoder does not mean that the Free Exercise
Clause is not implicated when the government burdens other forms
of religiously motivated conduct.
Limitations upon constitutional liberties should not be lightly
assumed. Absent a specific restriction in the text of the provision,
or an express directive from the Supreme Court, a constitutional
guarantee ought to apply to the full extent that its words imply.
The First Amendment protects the "exercise of religion," a cate
gory of conduct that appears broad on its face . Before one con
cludes that the Constitution only protects a subcategory of religious
practices - those that are central - it is appropriate to require
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See 406 U.S. at 210.
406 U.S. at 210.
See 406 U.S. at 218.
See 406 U.S. at 209, 212, 218, 219, 235.
See 406 U.S. at 209-10, 215, 216-17, 219, 235.
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some definitive statement to that effect from the Court. The hand
ful of references to the centrality of the Yoders' conduct does not
rise to the level of clarity one would expect if the Court intended to
impose such a significant constriction of a First Amendment
guarantee.
Second, other passages cast doubt upon the notion that Yoder
imposed a centrality requirement. At the outset of the opinion, the
Court implied that the Free Exercise Clause enjoyed a broad appli
cation, observing that the Constitution protected "religiously
based" and "religiously grounded" conduct.91 Moreover, at the end
of the opinion, the Court summarized the facts that contributed to
its finding that the Yoders had suffered a cognizable burden.92 A
reference to centrality is noticeably absent from the Court's recita
tion of the important elements of the Yoders' case,93 adding support
to the conclusion that Yoder did not restrict the First Amendment
to the exercise of central religious beliefs.94
Third, references to the centrality of the Yoders' religious prac
tices are consistent with the application of the motivation test.
Practices that are fundamental to a person's religious beliefs consti
tute a subset of religiously motivated conduct. By establishing that
the state had violated a central religious practice, the Yoders
thereby demonstrated that the government burdened a religiously
motivated practice. Given that the Court nowhere required a dem
onstration of centrality, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
Yoders proved more than was necessary when they established that
their religiously motivated conduct was also central to their
religion.95
One can also conclude from the facts of Yoder that a claimant
may satisfy her burden without demonstrating religious compulsion.
By their own account, the parents were not, strictly speaking, com
pelled by their religion to remove their children from formal educa
tion.96 On the contrary, their objection sprang from a general belief
91. See 406 U.S. at 220. The Court summarily rejected the state's assertion that the First
Amendment protects religious beliefs, but not religious conduct. See 406 U.S. at 219-20.
92. See 406 U.S. at 235-36.
93. See 406 U.S. at 235-36.
94. This conclusion seems especially appropriate, considering that no subsequent case
mentioned centrality to the extent of Yoder. See Berg, supra note 23, at 52 ("Thus, although
Yoder spent a good deal of time discussing how 'central' the concept of separation from the
world was to the Amish identity, the Court later backed off from making such judgments. In
unemployment cases after Sherbert, it simply deferred to the believer's claim about impor
tance." (citations omitted)).
95. This conclusion seems reasonable given the Court's statement that the plaintiffs
presented an unusually compelling claim. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235-36 (observing that the
plaintiffs made a "convincing showing, one that probably few other religious groups or sects
could make").
96. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 466 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he parents in Yoder did not argue that th;ir religion expressly
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in remaining separate from secular society.97 Because their faith
did not mandate opposition to the secondary schooling, the success
of the parents in Yoder exemplifies that claimants may establish a
cognizable burden without demonstrating religious compulsion.

B.

The Unemployment Compensation Cases

In the years between Yoder and Smith, the only plaintiffs who
successfully argued free exercise claims before the Court were
those who contested the denial of unemployment compensation
benefits.98 These precedents reveal that the Free Exercise Clause is
not limited to central or compelled practices.
In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division, 99 the Court outlined an approach that casts serious doubt
upon the permissibility of the centrality and compulsion tests. The
plaintiff, Eddie Thomas, worked in a foundry that produced steel
for industrial use, but was transferred to a department that manu
factured parts for military tanks.100 Believing that assisting in the
production of weapons would violate his religious scruples as a Je
hovah's Witness, he decided to terminate his employment rather
than surrender his principles.101 Mr. Thomas ultimately filed suit
after the state review board denied his application for unemploy
ment benefits.102
The Court began with the general observation that the Free Ex
ercise Clause protects beliefs and practices that are "rooted in reli
gion. "103 The Court decided this aspect of the case with relative
ease, finding "clear" support in the record that the plaintiff had quit
his job "for religious reasons."104
Having resolved this preliminary issue, the Court reviewed the
specific lines of inquiry entertained by the state court. The
proscribed public education beyond the eighth grade; rather, they objected to the law be
cause 'the values . . . of the modem secondary school are in sharp conflict with the fundamen
tal mode of life mandated by the Amish religion.' " (emphasis and alteration in original)
(quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217)); Ira C. Lupu, Of Tzme and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 203 (1995) ("Indeed, Yoder
itself could not withstand a view so pinched. Although the Old Order Amish parents did
assert that salvation required a life apart from worldly influence, they were not strictly
obliged by their faith doctrines to withdraw their children from school at the teenage
years.").
97. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
98. See Lupu, supra note 96, at 177.
99. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
100. See 450 U.S. at 710.
101. See 450 U.S. at 710.
102. See 450 U.S. at 712.
103. See 450 U.S. at 713-14.
104. See 450 U.S. at 716; see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (Burger, C.J.)
(observing that Thomas involved a "religiously motivated resignation").
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Supreme Court of Indiana had concluded that the plaintiff's objec
tion to the new work assignment stemmed from personal considera
tions, rather than religious convictions.105 In support of its finding,
the state court closely scrutinized the religious beliefs of Mr.
Thomas, and even considered the religious views of another be
liever.106 The Court soundly rejected these inquiries as constitu
tionally infirm, and in the process revealed three constitutional
principles that undermine both the centrality test and the compul
sion test.
First, the protection of the Free Exercise Clause must not de
pend upon "a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice
in question."107 The state court observed that the claimant opposed
working in a weapons factory, but would not object to providing
raw products that ultimately might be used for military purposes.1os
Perceiving an internal inconsistency, the state court concluded that
Thomas opposed the new assignment for philosophical rather than
religious reasons.109 Upon review, the Court repudiated this ap
proach, explaining that the First Amendment protects religious
practices even if they do not appear "acceptable, logical, consistent,
or comprehensible to others."110 Even the plaintiff's admission that
he was "struggling" with his beliefs did not dissuade the Court from
affording considerable deference to the believer's expression of his
religious convictions.111 "We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a
line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unrea
sonable one."112
Second, whether a practice qualifies for constitutional protec
tion is not contingent upon doctrinal conformity with other believ
ers. The Indiana Supreme Court gave special weight to the
testimony of another Jehovah's Witness, who stated that working in
an armaments factory would not violate his religious beliefs.113 The
fact that a fellow believer did not share the plaintiff's views con
vinced the state court that he had presented a meritless claim. Re
jecting this line of inquiry, the Court offered a broader vision of the
right to religious freedom. At its core, the Free Exercise Clause
protects individuals who dissent from the majority's interpretation
of religious doctrine. The disagreement with another believer did
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 712-13.
See 450 U.S. at 712-16.
450 U.S. at 714.
See 450 U.S. at 715.
See 450 U.S. at 714-15.
450 U.S. at 714.
See 450 U.S. at 715.
450 U.S. at 715.
See 450 U.S. at 715.
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not impair the plaintiff' s claim, the Court found, b�cause "the guar
antee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by
all of the members of a religious sect."114
Third, courts must decide free exercise claims without immers
ing themselves in the middle of theological disputes. The Court ac
knowledged that "[i]ntrafaith differences . . . are not uncommon
among followers of a particular creed." 115 Refusing to assume the
role of an ecclesiastical referee, .the Court candidly recognized that
"the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differ
ences in relation to the Religion Clauses." 116 In the words of the
Court, "[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial compe
tence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts
are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation." 117
These three principles strongly suggest that applying either the
centrality test or the compulsion test would contravene the require
ments of the Constitution. As will be developed in Part IV, both
tests entail intrusive inquiries into the claimant's religious beliefs.
Courts cannot remain faithful to the three commands of Thomas
showing deference to the individual believer, protecting doctrinal
diversity, and avoiding theological disputes
if they condition the
guarantee of religious freedom upon a demonstration that the prac
tice was central to or compelled by the claimant's religious
beliefs.118

-

-

114. 450 U.S. at 715-16.
115. 450 U.S. at 715.
116. 450 U.S. at 715.
117. 450 U.S. at 716.
118. An oft-quoted passage does not support a conclusion to the contrary. Discussing the
burden on Mr. Thomas, the Court stated:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a
religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by reli
gious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.
450 U.S. at 717-18. Despite this reference to mandatory and prohibited conduct, this state
ment should not be understood to support the compulsion test, for two reasons. First, there
is little reason to believe that the Court intended to exhaust the range of cognizable burdens
in this passage. By stating that a burden may exist if the government infringes upon compul
sory conduct, the Court did not thereby imply that a religious practice must be compulsory in
order to receive protection. Indeed, it would appear arbitrary to suggest that government
conduct constitutes a burden when the believer considers the practice to be compulsory, but
that identical state action would not amount to a burden if the believer views the religious
practice to be noncompulsory. Second, the middle of this passage reveals the true focus of
the Court: a cognizable burden exists when the government places "substantial pressure on
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." 450 U.S. at 718 (emphasis
added}. The underlying concern, it appears, is to limit governmental encroachment upon
religious conduct. As such, the adverse treatment of the claimant, rather than her theological
views, determines whether the state has imposed a substantial burden upon the exercise of
religion.
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Building upon Thomas, the Court extended the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause to recent converts in Hobbie v. Unemploy
ment Appeals Commission ofFlorida.119 After joining the Seventh
day Adventist Church, Paula Hobbie informed her employer that
she would no longer be able to work on the Sabbath, a decision that
ultimately resulted in her dismissal. The state subsequently refused
her request for unemployment benefits, finding that she had been
discharged for "misconduct connected with [her] work."1 2 0 Echo
ing Sherbert and Thomas, the Court found that the subsequent de
nial of unemployment benefits imposed a cognizable burden,
because it forced her "to choose between fidelity to religious belief
and continued employment. "1 2 1 The fact that the plaintiff had re
cently converted to the faith did not dissuade the Court from pro
tecting her "religiously motivated choice."1 22
Addressing yet another denial of unemployment benefits in Fra
the Court re
inforced the notion that the First Amendment protects individual
believers, irrespective of whether they share the beliefs of any par
ticular religious group. As an avowed Christian, William Frazee
professed an opposition to working on Sunday. The state denied
his request for unemployment benefits, however, because he was
not a member of any particular church or denomination. Upon re
view, the Court repeated that the individual right to the free exer
cise of religion does not depend upon allegiance to the doctrine of a
broader religious community. As the Court explained, an in
dependent believer may invoke the protection of the First Amend
ment without reference to the views of other believers: "[W]e
reject the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular
religious organization. Here, Frazee's refusal was based on a sin
cerely held religious belief. Under our cases, he was entitled to in-

zee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,123

119. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
120. 480 U.S. at 139 (alteration in original).
121. 480 U.S. at 144. Once again, the Court referred to the exercise of religion in general
tenns, without suggesting that the First Amendment only protects central or compelled prac
tices. See also 480 U.S. at 137 (referring broadly to the claimant's "sincerely held religious
convictions").
122. See 480 U.S. at 142 n.7; 480 U.S. at 148 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court's opin
ion in Hobbie also suggests that a demonstration of centrality is not required under the Con
stitution. At the outset of the opinion, the Court noted that Ms. Robbie's "conversion was
bona fide and that her religious belief is sincerely held." 480 U.S. at 138 n.2. Unlike Sherbert
and Yoder, however, the Hobbie opinion makes no reference to the centrality of the claim
ant's religious practice - the opinion provides no indication that this particular claimant
viewed the observance of the Sabbath as a central practice of her religion. The absence of
any reference to centrality in Hobbie suggests that the Free Exercise Clause is not restricted
to central religious practices.
123. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
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voke First Amendment protection."124 In short, the Free Exercise
Clause protects individual believers without requiring confonnance
to the doctrine of a larger religious community. As will be elabo
rated in Part IV, the centrality and compulsion tests undermine the
holding in Frazee, often requiring claimants to establish centrality
or compulsion by reference to the views of other members of the
faith.
C.

Repudiating the Centrality Test

Beginning with Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, 125 the Court issued a series of opinions that explicitly

repudiated the centrality test as a constitutionally infirm inquiry.126
Lyng addressed a Forest Service proposal to construct a road in a.
national forest over land that was sacred to local Native American
tribes.121 The centrality test entered the fray at the suggestion of
dissenting Justice Brennan. Seeking to balance the competing in
terests, Justice Brennan proposed that the plaintiffs be required to
124. 489 U.S. at 834 (emphasis added). This passage reveals that an individual suffers a
cognizable burden when the state infringes upon the exercise of a "sincerely held religious
belief." This general statement supports the conclusion that the First Amendment protects
religious practices, irrespective of whether the claimant believes that they are central or
compelled.
125. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
126. In other contexts, the Court has significantly restricted the scope of cognizable bur
dens. In institutional settings, such as prisons and the military, believers will encounter
greater difficulty establishing a substantial burden upon their free exercise rights. See
O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). A
claimant may also Jack a prima facie claim if she cannot establish a violation of a specific
religious belief, or if she challenges the internal workings of the government. See Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693 (1986). The Court imposed these limitations, however, without reference to whether the
practices were central to or compelled by the claimants' religious beliefs.
During the legislative hearings for the RFRA, one advocate suggested that the Free Exer
cise Clause only protects religiously mandated practices, on the basis of the Court's holding
in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See S. 2969, supra note 6, at 239 (statement of James
Bopp, Jr.). Harris addressed a free exercise challenge to the Hyde Amendment, which lim
ited the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse the cost of abortions. The Court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the free exercise challenge, because "none [of the indigent
pregnant women] alleged, much less proved, that she sought an abortion under compulsion
of religious belief." 448 U.S. at 320. Despite this passing reference to "compulsion," the
Court found that the plaintiffs Jacked standing, not because their religious beliefs did not
mandate abortions, but because the women did not allege an infringement of their religious
beliefs at all. The plaintiffs, in fact, brought the free exercise challenge because "a woman's
decision to seek a medically necessary abortion may be a product of her religious beliefs
under certain Protestant and Jewish tenets." 448 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added). Thus under
stood, Harris does not require a demonstration of compulsion, but merely stands for the
rather unexceptional proposition that litigants lack standing to raise a free exercise challenge
on their own behalf if they do not allege that the government burdened the exercise of their
personal religious beliefs.
127. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
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demonstrate that the land-use decision adversely affected sites that
were "central" to the practice of their religion.128
The majority responded by rejecting the centrality test in no un

certain terms. As the Court explained, unless courts automatically
accept a claimant's assertion of centrality, this standard places
courts in the position of deciding whether the claimant is correct in
professing that a practice is central to her religion.129 If a court
holds that the practice is not in fact central, in spite of the claim
ant's statement to the contrary, the court would implicitly decide
that the claimant misunderstands the principles of her own religious
faith.130 The majority concluded that "such an approach cannot be
squared with the Constitution or with our precedents," and would
"cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play."131
The Court returned to the issue of centrality in Hernandez v.
Commissioner.132 Addressing a free exercise challenge to the dis

allowance of a tax deduction, the Court began with a broad state
ment that appeared to open the door to inquiries into centrality.133
The Court immediately explained, however, that courts must not
undertake judicial expeditions into religious territory. "It is not
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs
or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpre
tations of those creeds."134
128. See 485 U.S. at 473-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. See 485 U.S. at 457.
130. See 485 U.S. at 457-58.
131. 485 U.S. at 458. This rationale for rejecting the centrality test would seem to apply
to the compulsion test with equal force. There is little reason to believe that courts are capa
ble of discerning whether a practice is compelled, given their inability to detennine whether a
practice is central. Both tests place courts in the untenable position of second-guessing the
avowed religious beliefs of a devout litigant.
132. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
133. See 490 U.S. at 699 ("The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed
a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice
").
134. 490 U.S. at 699. Given that this passage specifically rejected inquiries into centrality,
it is curious that the preceding sentence in the opinion cast the free exercise inquiry in tenns
of a burden upon a "central religious belief or practice." Perhaps the Court meant that prac
tices must be central in order to be protected, but courts cannot second guess an assertion
that the centrality requirement has been satisfied. In other words, one might interpret this
passage to create a subjective centrality requirement - the claimant must believe that the
practice is central in order to receive protection, but the court cannot dispute the avowed
centrality of the practice.
This interpretation of Hernandez seems unlikely - in practical tenns, it would amount to
a requirement that the plaintiff plead centrality, and nothing more. It also seems doubtful
that the Court would establish such a requirement with a passing reference in an introductory
sentence, without offering any rationale, and without acknowledging the clear repudiation of
centrality inquiries in Lyng. Moreover, given that the text of the First Amendment broadly
protects the "exercise of religion," there is little reason to restrict this constitutional guaran
tee to the central practices of one's faith. Practices that are not central to one's religion are
no less deserving< of constitutional protection. This conclusion seems all the more sound
when one considers other rights protected by the First Amendment. It would be unthinkable
.

•

.

.
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Although a construction of the RF RA must tum upon the pre

Smith case law, it is noteworthy that the Court once again expressed
disapproval of the centrality test in the Smith135 decision. Building

a case against the compelling state interest test, the Court ad
dressed the contention that the test should apply only when the
state burdens a central religious practice.136 The majority explained
that the judiciary is institutionally incapable of deciding the role of
a particular practice within a claimant's religion:
What principle of la w or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a
believer's assertion that a particular act is "central" to his personal
f aith ? J
udg n
i g the centralityof di ff
erent religious practices is akin to
the unacceptable "business of evaluating the relative merits of di ffer
n
i g religious claims "
. . . . Repeatedlyand in manydi fferent contexts ,
we have warned that courts must not pres ume to determine the place
of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious
claim.137
to suggest, for example, that the Free Speech Clause protects only the "central" statements of
a speaker, or that the Free Press Clause extends only to the "central" practices of the media.
A more plausible explanation is that the Court referred to a burden upon a central prac
tice in descriptive, rather than prescriptive, terms. The Court probably intended to make the
observation that believers are more likely to challenge government conduct if it encroaches
upon practices that are central to their religion, even though the practices need not be central
to merit protection under the Constitution.
135. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
136. See 494 U.S. at 886.
137. 494 U.S. at 887-88 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)); see also 494 U.S. at 906 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment) ("I agree with the Court [that] '[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.' " (citation omitted) (quoting Her
nandez, 490 U.S. at ·699)); 494 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I agree with Justice
O'Connor that courts should refrain from delving into questions whether, as a matter of
religious doctrine, a particular practice is 'central' to the religion.''); Muslim v. Frame, 897 F.
Supp. 215, 220 (1995) (observing that the Court in Smith "unanimously rejected a centrality
inquiry on the basis of judicial competence").
The text of Smith sharply criticized the centrality test, but footnote four contained the
bulk of the Court's larger point. The majority attempted to use the established failure of the
centrality test as another reason for dispensing with the compelling state interest standard
when claimants challenge generally applicable laws. After the text reaffirmed the pre-Smith
repudiation of the centrality test, footnote four introduced an entirely new proposition:
courts cannot apply the compelling state interest test without inquiring into the centrality of
the religious practice. In the Court's words, dispensing with considerations of centrality
would be "utterly unworkable," because "both the importance of the law at issue and the
centrality of the practice at issue must reasonably be considered" if claimants are able to
challenge generally applicable laws on free exercise grounds. 494 U.S. at 888 n.4 (emphasis
omitted). A '"[c]onstitutionally significant burden,"' Justice Scalia believed, "would seem to
be 'centrality' under another name." 494 U.S. at 887-88 n.4. Without the burden of establish
ing centrality, Justice Scalia feared that claimants would demand protection for Lilliputian
concerns, thus giving "the practice of throwing rice at church weddings" the same status as
"the practice of getting married in church." 494 U.S. at 888 n.4. To summarize the Court's
argument, because the compelling state interest standard requires a judicial determination of
the centrality of a religious practice, and because courts are institutionally incapable of evalu
ating centrality, the compelling state interest test must be an inappropriate standard for free
exercise claims.
When addressing the Court's argument, it is essential to recall that the RFRA rejects the
Smith approach in favor of the Sherbert line of cases. Congress envisioned that courts would
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As the Court explained, it is inappropriate for courts to evaluate
the "centrality" of a practice when deciding a free exercise claim,
just as it is improper for courts to decide the "importance" of ideas
in free speech cases.13s
In her concurring opinion in Smith, Justice O'Connor made
clear what has been at least implicit in the preceding series of free
exercise cases. No less than one dozen times, Justice O'Connor
made reference to the fact that the Constitution protects practices
that are "motivated" by religion.139 These passages quietly attest to
a principle that now seems clear: the First Amendment protects
practices that are motivated by religious beliefs, irrespective of
whether the believer views them to be central or compelled.
III.

THE INCLUSIVE S COPE OF THE RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION
TEST

This Part focuses on the scope of each of the three tests, and
argues that the motivation test offers the appropriate breadth of
protection for religious-based conduct. Section I.A demonstrates
that the centrality test and the compulsion test exclude religious
practices that warrant protection under the RFRA. Section I.B
contends that these two standards also categorically exclude certain
religious groups, whose practices cannot be understood in terms of
centrality or compulsion.
A.

The Exclusion of Certain Religious Practices

As their names reveal, the three competing interpretations of
the RFRA do not protect an identical range of religious conduct.
The religious motivation test encompasses all practices that are
principally motivated by sincere religious beliefs. In contrast, the
centrality test confines the statute to the fundamental aspects of
one's faith, and the compulsion test limits the Act to practices that
are either mandated or prohibited by one's religious beliefs. By
construe the Act according to pre-Smith case law, and thus Smith can contribute to a con
struction of the Act only to the extent that it confonns with the preceding free exercise
jurisprudence. When the text of Smith repeated the earlier renunciation of the centrality test,
the Court plainly echoed its prior holdings, therefore, this passage can infonn a construction
of the Act. When footnote four claimed that centrality inquiries are inherent in the applica
tion of the compelling state interest test, however, the Court embraced a novel proposition
that found no support in the preceding case law. As a result, this material departure from the
Court's free exercise heritage ought not be considered by those who construe the RFRA.
At another level, there is little reason to accept the premise that application of the com
pelling state interest test entails a consideration of centrality. Whether the government im
poses a cognizable burden can and should be determined by the degree of governmental
interference with religious conduct and not by the theological views of the individual
claimant.
138. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87.
� � � � � � � � �� � � m � � � � m
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failing to include the entire spectrum of religious conduct, the cen
trality and compulsion tests leave vulnerable a significant number
of religious practices, and thereby frustrate the broad remedial
goals of the RFRA.
The compulsion test offers insufficient protection for the exer
cise of religion because it misperceives the nature of religious expe
rience. At its core, the compulsion test assumes that the exercise of
religion amounts to nothing more than obedience to a set of com
mands and prohibitions. Put another way, the compulsion test rests
upon a duty-based conception of religion, viewing religious prac
tices in terms of the "do's" and "don'ts" of one's faith. Although it
is beyond doubt that some religious practices can be understood in
such terms, it is equally certain that not all religious conduct in
cludes the element of compulsion.140 Indeed, believers engage in
many religious practices that are not strictly compelled by their reli
gion.141 For example, believers might pray the rosary, contribute
financially to a place of worship, or care for the poor without feel
ing strictly compelled to do so.142 Under the compulsion test, the
state could encroach upon any of these religious practices with im
punity, because those who engage in such noncompulsory conduct
would be unable to establish that the government burdened a com
pulsory religious practice.143 The compulsion test significantly con140. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 1373,
1390 {1981) ("One of the most common errors in free exercise analysis is to try to fit all free
exercise claims into the conscientious objector category and reject the ones that do not fit.
Under this approach, every free exercise claim requires an elaborate judicial inquiry into the
conscience or doctrines of the claimant. If he is not compelled by religion to engage in the
disputed conduct, he is not entitled to free exercise protection. . . . This approach reflects a
rigid, simplistic, and erroneous view of religion.").
141. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Many religious practices
that clearly are not mandatory . . . are important to their practitioners, who would consider
the denial of them a grave curtailment of their religious liberty."); Hearings on H.R. 2797,
supra note 6, at 322 (statement of Dean Gaffney) {"We do lots of thiµgs in our religious
exercise that are not compelled."); id. at 370 (statement of Prof. Laycock) ("[A]n amendment
limiting the bill to conduct that is religiously compelled would impose serious costs on reli
gious liberty.") (providing four case examples); see also Berg, supra note 23, at 53; Douglas
Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
841, 847 {1992).
142. See Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 782, 803-04 (1992) ("Although a specific religious tenet may not man
date and define the nature of a pastoral counseling center, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation
program, or a community's participation in moral dialogue, it surely is the case that these
forms of religious conduct are rooted firmly in belief and are motivated by broad obligations
to love and serve the neighbor." (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); Laycock, supra
note 140, at 1390 ("Many activities that obviously are exercises of religion are not required
by conscience or doctrine. Singing in the church choir and saying the Roman Catholic rosary
are two common examples."). Other examples of religious practices that may not be strictly
compelled include: building a place of worship, operating a homeless shelter, attending reli
gious services, and studying at religious educational institutions.
143. Of course, claimants could present a free exercise challenge to a law if it lacked a
rational basis, or if it specifically targeted religious activity. See Church of the Lukumi
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stricts the scope of the statute, leaving many believers without
recourse if the government interferes with the exercise of their reli
gious beliefs. This unfortunate consequence of the compulsion test
is difficult to reconcile with the broad remedial purposes of the
RFRA.144
When actually employed in a free exercise case, the underinclu
sive scope of the compulsion test leads to unacceptable distinctions
between comparable religious practices. A case decided prior to
the enactment of the RFRA illustrates the point. In Brandon v.
Board of Education, 145 a Christian student organization filed suit
after school officials denied their request to conduct prayer meet
ings on school premises.146 The Second Circuit found no cognizable
burden on their exercise of religion, resting its decision upon a du
bious distinction between voluntary and compulsory prayer. The
court observed that members of the aptly named "Students for Vol
untary Prayer" were not required by their religious beliefs to pray
together before school. Because the prayer session was not strictly
compelled by their religion, the court concluded that the denial of
access did not violate the students' right to the free exercise of
religion.147
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Smith, 494 U.S. 872. The point here
is simply that the compulsion test forecloses the opportunity to present a RFRA challenge,
and thus to enjoy the benefit of the compelling state interest test, when the state infringes
upon noncompulsory practices through neutral laws of general applicability.
144. Those who urged passage of the RFRA anticipated that the statute would confer
broad protection for religious freedom. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993) ("[T]he
committee finds that legislation is needed to restore the compelling interest test. As Justice
O'Connor stated in Smith, '(t]he compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's man
date of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.' " (em
phasis added) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment))); H.R.
REP. No. 103-88, at 6-7 (1993) (same); see also 139 CONG. REC. H8,714 (daily ed. Nov. 3,
1993) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("[T]oday, we have taken another step to ensure that the
promise of the first amendment and the protections afforded by the Constitution are avail
able to all religious believers."); 139 CONG. REC. Sl4,467 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy) ("The Religious Freedom Restoration Act will assure all Americans the
right to follow the teaching of their faiths, free from Government interference."); 139 CONG.
REc. Sl4,469 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bradley) ("[T]his bill breathes new
life into the protections we give for the free exercise of religion and ensures that
freedom
of religion will again be restored as a constitutional norm, not an anomaly. This bill ensures
that religious liberty will once again be given its proper place among our most valued liber
ties."); 139 CoNG. REc. H2,357 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Fish) ("Since
Smith was decided in 1990, individuals seeking to practice their religion, unhampered by
Government action, have largely been without recourse. The Religious Freedom Restora
tion Act will provide them with a means to challenge Government regulations which unnec
essarily burden the free exercise of religion. The legislation will guarantee that all
Americans, regardless of their particular creed or oath, are able to enjoy the right to worship
and practice their faith, [free] from unnecessary Government intrusion.").
•

145. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
146. See 635 F.2d at 973.
147. See 635 F.2d at 977.

.

.
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With remarkable candor, the court revealed that the decision
likely would have been different if the students had been followers
of Islam. Unlike the plaintiffs ' Christian beliefs, the court observed,
the Muslim faith requires its followers to prostrate themselves "five
times daily in the direction of Mecca. "148 Without explaining why
the presence of compulsion was constitutionally significant, the
court expressed the view that the Constitution would require access
to school facilities if the claim were brought by Muslim students.149
The court in Brandon thus illustrates the perils created by the com
pulsion test. Needless to say, an approach that affords different
treatment to Christian and Muslim prayer offers insufficient protec
tion for the exercise of religion.150
Like the compulsion test, the centrality test excludes religious
activities that deserve protection under the RFRA. Almost by defi
nition, only a limited number of religious practices can be funda
mental to a person's religion. Indeed, for many believers, only a
moment's reflection is needed to call to mind a number of sincere
religious practices that are not necessarily "central" to their reli
gion. For example, for some individuals, singing in a church choir,
volunteering at a homeless shelter, or supporting a religious charity
are important religious practices, though they might not view such
participation - as central to their religion. The centrality test
removes such practices from the sphere of protection afforded by
the RFRA, leaving them vulnerable to governmental interference.
Practices that are not central to a believer's religion are no less
deserving of protection under the RFRA.151 Noncentral practices
contribute to the richness of religious experience, complementing
the fundamental aspects of one's faith in meaningful ways. Such
practices often serve as an expression of the believer's faith, and
allow individuals to carry out their beliefs in everyday life. The ex
clusion of noncentral religious practices deprives believers of the
right to participate fully in their religious heritage, and thus falls
148. 635 F.2d at 977.
149. See 635 F.2d at 977.
150. The Supreme Court of Washington reached an equally remarkable result in Witters
v. State Commn. for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989) (en bane). The Commission for
the Blind denied a student financial assistance for vocational training because he sought to
pursue Biblical studies in preparation for a career as a pastor or missionary. See 771 P.2d at
1120. The student alleged that the denial of funding due to the religious nature of his studies
violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court of Washington ap
plied the "compulsion test" and achieved a counter-intuitive result: because the student's
religion did not mandate that he become a minister, the denial of funding did not implicate
his right to freely exercise his religion. See 771 P.2d at 1123.
151. Just as the Free Speech Clause is not confined to the central parts of a person's
speech, so also the Free Exercise Clause, and the RFRA, should not be limited to the central
parts of a person's religion.
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short of the RFRA's goal to secure religious freedom for individual
believers.152
In contrast to these two interpretations, the religious motivation
test fully protects the "exercise of religion." Even a casual observer
of religion is undoubtedly aware that believers engage in all sorts of
religious practices, including those practices that are neither funda
mental nor mandatory. The motivation test reflects an appreciation
for this diversity by extending the RFRA to the entire spectrum of
religious experience. Under this approach, any practice that is prin
cipally motivated by religion can enjoy the protection of the RFRA.
Unlike the centrality test and the compulsion test, which limit the
Act to subsets of religious conduct, the motivation test embraces
the diversity of religious practices by protecting the full range of
religious conduct.153
B.

The Exclusion of Certain Religious Groups

The motivation test also extends the RFRA to all religious
groups. This approach allows believers of any religion to invoke
the. RFRA when the government infringes upon their religiously
motivated practices. In contrast, the centrality test and the compul
sion test only protect certain forms of religion, leaving vulnerable
those believers who follow minority faiths. The inability of these
two tests to cover all religious groups militates strongly in favor of a
more inclusive approach: the religious motivation test.
152. See sources cited supra note 144. Moreover, the text of the RFRA reflects an appre
ciation for the holistic religious experience, broadly protecting the "exercise of religion."
153. Critics of the motivation test might argue that this approach offers too much protec
tion for religious practices. Some religious plaintiffs might claim, so the argument goes, that
most everything they do is "motivated" by religion in a very real sense. If the RFRA covers
religiously motivated practices, religious individuals might be able to challenge almost every
governmental action, thus forcing the state to justify its policies under the compelling state
interest test.
This objection fails to withstand close analysis. First, the legislative history reveals that
the motivation test only extends to practices that are principally motivated by religious be
liefs. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 136 (statement of Rep. Solarz). Even if a
litigant claimed that every action was motivated by religion at some level, the claimant would
have to demonstrate that religion provided the principal motivation behind the activity in
question. As an empirical matter, there are probably few religious individuals who would
claim that their every action is principally motivated by religion. This intuition is reinforced
by the RFRA and free exercise case law: litigants have yet to claim that their right to reli
gious freedom extends to everything they do. Second, even if a litigant did make this bold
claim, a court would not be forced to accept the individual's assertion without further in
quiry. On the contrary, the court must determine whether a litigant is sincere in her religious
objection to a governmental policy. Very few individuals could sincerely claim that religion
provides the principal motivation for every action in everyday life. Third, even if courts
encountered a few such claims, brought by sincere individuals, the litigation would hardly be
able to debilitate the state: the government would have the opportunity to justify its practice
under the compelling state interest test. Fourth, the Court has previously shown displeasure
with such slippery-slope objections. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963)
(rejecting the speculative claim that the compelling state interest test will encourage the "fil
ing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections").
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The compulsion test does not extend to all religious groups be
cause it misconceives the nature of religious faith. As stated above,
the compulsion test views the practice of religion as obedience to a
set of sacred commands and prohibitions. This narrow conception
of religion results in the exclusion of recognized religious groups
from the refuge of the RFRA. Although some religions instruct
their followers to obey the commands and prohibitions of the faith,
other religious groups, especially those outside the Judeo-Christian
tradition, lack the concept of religious compulsion. Theravada
Buddhism, for example, is a nonduty-based religion, which empha
sizes inward spiritual maturity rather than obedience to religious
mandates. 1 54 Unfortunately, if the state substantially burdened the
exercise of this religion, the compulsion test would insulate the
state's action from review under the RFRA, because followers of
this faith would not be able to demonstrate a burden upon a relig
iously compelled practice. The compulsion test thus would fore
close the opportunity to challenge state action under the RFRA
when the state infringes upon religions that do not compel the con
duct of their followers.
The centrality test rests upon a similarly fl.awed view of religion,
and thus creates a comparable exclusion of certain religious groups.
By requiring a demonstration of centrality, this test assumes that all
religions have' practices that are more central than others. Not all
religions, however, necessarily maintain practices that can be
termed "central." 1 55 For example, faiths that either embrace all re
ligions, such as certain New Age religions, 1 56 and groups that sup
port no unifying creed, such as the Quakers, 1 57 may not be able to
demonstrate that any particular practice is central to their religious
beliefs. Individuals who adhere to such religions cannot share in
154. See NANCY WILSON Ross, BUDDHISM: A WAY OF LIFE AND THOUGIIT 80 (1980)
("[W]hereas in our Western religious tradition sins and virtues are matters of 'Thou shalt'
and 'Thou shalt not,' the Theravada Buddhist has no similar commandments. There are in
stead, counsels of perfection which begin 'It is better to . . .' or 'It is better not to . . .' follow
such and such a course of action. This type of instruction leaves the choice of behavior to the
individual, who remains free to verify through his own experience the wisdom of these sug
gestions." (quoted in Berg, supra note 23, at 53 n.228)).
155. See TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1249 n.48 ("[T]he very concepts of 'centrality'
and 'religious burden' may be tied to particular religious traditions. Various forms of Christi
anity, for example, have clear divisions between secular and religious spheres, while other
Christian sects, and other religions, perceive themselves as consisting of an integrated way of
life.").
156. The Truth of Life Movement and other New Age religious groups fit into this cate
gory. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS: RELIGIOUS CREEDS 690-92 (J.
Gordon Melton ed., 1st ed. 1988).
157. The Quakers, the Unitarians, and the Bahais are generally viewed as noncreedal,
and thus may lack practices that may be termed "central.'' See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN RELIGIONS: RELIGIOUS CREEDS, supra note 156, at 448-49, 649-50, 788.
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the religious freedom offered by the RFRA so long as courts con
tinue to require a demonstration of centrality.
This categorical exclusion of religious groups is problematic on a
number of levels. First, excluding particular religions from the pro
tection of the RFRA betrays the spirit of the ecumenical coalition
that rallied support for the Act. The RFRA came into existence
largely through the efforts of the religious community, which united
in support of the bill notwithstanding their theological differ
ences.158 Courts cannot remain faithful to the ecumenical origins of
the RFRA so long as they adopt interpretations of the statute that
deny certain religious groups an equal share of religious freedom.
Second, the exclusion of minority religious groups violates a
central purpose of the RFRA - to prevent the government from
imposing majoritarian conceptions of religion. As Justice Scalia
conceded in Smith, leaving accommodation to the political process
places unpopular religious groups at a "relative disadvantage. "159
In order to protect minority religious groups, which would remain
vulnerable if the political process represented their only recourse,
Congress returned supervisory powers to the judiciary, empowering
them to strictly scrutinize governmental action that burdens the ex
ercise of religion.16° Courts that adopt the centrality test or the
compulsion test, however, unwittingly reintroduce majoritarian reli
gious perspectives, as evidenced by the exclusion of minority reli
gious groups. The adoption of these two tests thus undermines a
central goal of the RFRA - to secure religious freedom for minor
ity groups who cannot protect themselves through the political
process.161
158. See sources cited supra note 7.
159. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990); see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1021 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Religions that have
fewer members, especially if those members are drawn from the margins of society, do not
have sufficient influence over the legislative process to avoid being flailed by the dinosaur's
tail of legislation of general applicability, legislation not motivated by any animus toward
minor sects but merely insensitive to their interests - possibly even oblivious to their exist
ence."); Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 104 (statement of Nadine Strossen) ("[I]t is
precisely the most unpopular religions practiced by the most marginalized and vulnerable
people in our society where we cannot expect the legislative process to be attentive to their
beliefs. . . . It is the minority religions, the unpopular religions, the new religions that are
going to be discriminated against.").
160. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 {1943) ("The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.").
161. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 127 (statement of Rep. Solarz) {"If
religious freedom has any meaning at all, it is that everyone's exercise of religion must be
protected equally - free from the threat that popular passions will interfere with the en
forcement of so fundamental a liberty."); S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 {1993) {"State and local
legislative bodies cannot be relied upon to craft exceptions from laws of general application

March 1997]

Note - Restoring Rights to Rites

1505

Third, and most importantly, interpreting the Act so as to ex
clude certain religious groups violates the First Amendment.
Throughout its history, the Court has repeatedly declared that the
state may not show favoritism toward any particular religion.162 In
deed, "[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that
one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over an
other. "163 Both the compulsion test and the centrality test violate
this prohibition by adopting models of religion that favor certain
religious groups while entirely excluding others.164 Denying relief
to individuals, simply because they follow religions without central
or compelled practices, contravenes the First Amendment's com
mand to give equal treatment to different religions.
The religious motivation test, in contrast, avoids these serious
pitfalls. Under this approach, followers of any religion may invoke
the RFRA when the government imposes a substantial burden
upon religiously motivated conduct. Presumably, no religious ad
herent can claim to be excluded by a standard that protects relig
iously motivated practices. Unlike competing interpretations,
which exclude certain religious groups from the outset, the motiva
tion test allows followers of any religion to utilize the Act when the
government infringes upon the exercise of religion.165 By extending
to protect the ability of the religious minorities to practice their faiths, an explicit fundamen
tal constitutional right . . . . To assure that all Americans are free to follow their faiths free
from governmental interference, the committee finds that legislation is needed to restore the
compelling interest test."); see also Hearings on H.R. 5377, supra note 7, at 20 (statement of
Rep. Solarz); Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 129 (statement of Rep. Solarz); Hear
ings on H.R. 5377, supra note 7, at 70 (statement of the Anti-Defamation League).
162. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1968) ("The First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion . . . . [T]he State may not
adopt programs or practices . . . which 'aid or oppose' any religion. This prohibition is abso
lute." (citation omitted) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)));
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The
fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government . . . effect no favoritism
among sects . . . and that it work deterrence of no religious belief."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The government must be neutral wlien it comes to cpmpetition be
tween sects."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (noting that the state cannot
"prefer one religion over another"); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) ("The
First Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred
treatment. It puts them all in that position.").
163. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also 456 U.S. at 245 ("This constitu
tional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the continu
ing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause.").
164. See Lupu, supra note 10, at 958 ("When narrow, ethnocentric models of religion are
employed by decisionmakers, free exercise adjudication may readily become a vehicle for
judicial violations of the establishment clause.").
165. Indeed, if there were a religion without religiously motivated practices, there would
never be an occasion to bring a claim under the RFRA for a governmental infringement of a
religious practice. If religions without practices did, in fact, exist, the government would only
be able to infringe upon their religious beliefs, and such regulation is prohibited per se under
the First Amendment. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
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the RFRA to followers of all religions, the motivation test reflects
an appreciation for the origins of the statute, protects minority
groups that would remain vulnerable in the political process, and
remains faithful to the requirements of the Constitution.
IV.

HEEDING JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS

The religious motivation test recognizes the limitations placed
upon courts that interpret and apply the RFRA. Under this ap
proach, courts must decide whether sincere religious beliefs provide
the principal motivation behind a claimant's course of conduct. Re
quiring courts to determine a claimant's motivations does not place
insuperable burdens on the judiciary, and does not encourage
courts to engage in an inappropriate line of inquiry.
In contrast, both the centrality test and the compulsion test in
vite courts to make judgments that are beyond the bounds of their
capacity and their authority. In two important respects, both tests
encourage determinations that exceed the limits placed upon the
judiciary. Section I.A argues that courts lack the ability to discern
whether a practice is in fact central to or compelled by a claimant's
religious beliefs. Section LB contends that courts cannot apply
either test without violating the prohibition against resolving theo
logical disputes.
A.

The Limits of Judicial Capacit)!

A primary difficulty with the centrality and compulsion tests is
that neither standard can be meaningfully administered by the
courts. Each test assumes that courts are capable of discerning
whether a practice is either central to or compelled by a claimant's
religious beliefs. Courts, however, lack the capacity to make such
judgments, because there is no definitive authority against which to
measure a claimant ' s assertions regarding centrality or
compulsion.166
Imagine that a devout individual presented a RFRA claim
before a court that adopted the centrality test. Unless the court
accepts the practitioner's own evaluation of the centrality of the
practice,167 the court would have to consider extrinsic evidence to
determine if the practice is, in fact, central to the claimant's reli
gious beliefs. Similarly, if the court adopted the compulsion test,
the court would need to consider evidence apart from the believer's
own views to decide whether her faith compelled the practice in
166. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 61 B.U. L. REV. 391, 405 {1987) (noting that courts lack "com
petence to choose between conflicting assertions of the content of religious doctrine").
167. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 457 (1988).
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question. In short, unless courts are willing to defer to a believer's
judgment regarding centrality or compulsion, they must appeal to
some external source of authority to determine if a given religious
practice is in fact central or compelled.
A fundamental problem arises, however, when courts search for
a body of authority by which to gauge whether a claimant's reli
gious practice is central or compelled. Neither religious texts, nor
religious experts, nor even those in positions of spiritual leadership,
'
can disprove · the religious beliefs of an individual believer.
Courts sometimes make the mistake of accepting the testimony
of other members of the claimant's faith, believing that such indi
viduals can offer insights about the religious practice in question.16s
The religious views of other individuals, however, cannot disprove
that the claimant believes the practice to be central or compelled.169
The practice of religion, after all, is an intensely personal enter
prise.170 Individuals invariably form religious views that differ from
those held by members of the same faith.171 Because individuals
develop personally tailored religious beliefs, the religious views of
other believers cannot be used to contest the beliefs of a particular
claimant.
Even an appeal to the "mainstream" view of members of the
claimant's religion misses the essential point. The right to the free
exercise of religion includes the right to develop viewpoints that
168. See, e.g., Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir.
1995) (finding that Friday services were not "fundamental" to the claimant's religion on the
basis of a chaplain's testimony about the Islamic religion); Rhinehart v. Gomez, No. 93-CV3747, 1995 WL 364339, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 1995) (rejecting a prisoner's objection to
tuberculosis testing, on the basis of testimony from a Muslim authority).
169. See TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1249 ("When a claimant avers that a prohibi
tion or requirement conflicts with his or her own faith, the appropriate inquiry may begin but
cannot end by looking to the dogma of a religious tract or organization; the ultimate inquiry
must look to the claimant's sincerity in stating that the conflict is indeed burdensome for that
individual").
170. See generally Note, supra note 10, at 1266-69.
171. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In religious matters, we take
judicial notice of the fact that often the keenest disputes and the most lively intolerance exists
among persons of the same general religious belief, who, however, are in disagreement as to
what that faith requires in particular matters."); see also Laycock, supra note 140, at 1391 ("A
church is a complex and dynamic organization, often including believers with a variety of
views on important questions of faith, morals, and spirituality. . . . [T]he officially promul
gated church doctrine, on which courts too often rely, is not a reliable indication of what the
faithful believe. At best the officially promulgated doctrine of a large denomination repre
sents the dominant or most commonly held view; it cannot safely be imputed to every be
liever or every affiliated congregation." (citation omitted)); Lupu, supra note 10, at 959
("[T]he individualization of religion in the Court's free exercise decisions renders the concept
of centrality even less useful; what is central to one observant may be peripheral to others,
including some or all of the 'experts.' " (citation omitted)); Thomas E. Geyer, Comment, Free
Exercise Jurisprudence: A Comment on the Heightened Threshold and the Proposal of the
"Burden Plus" Standard, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 1035, 1043 (1989) ("[A] burden to one believer
may be trivial to another believer of the same faith.").
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vary from those of other believers.112 This right to form one's own
religious beliefs would be circumscribed if courts could consider the
subjective religious views of other individuals when addressing the
avowed beliefs of a particular litigant.173
The Court's candid discussion of judicial limitations in
Thomas114 supports this conclusion. The lower court gave great
weight to the testimony of another Jehovah's Witness, who ex
pressed a view about working in an armaments factory that differed
from that of the plaintiffPS The Supreme Court soundly rejected
the notion that courts are allowed to consider the religious views of
other believers. "Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncom
mon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process
is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to
the Religion Clauses."176
Besides an appeal to other members of the faith, alternative
sources of evidence prove to be equally unhelpful. Scrutinizing the
practice itself would be a fruitless exercise, because it is unclear
what a "central" or "compelled" practice looks like, especially
when one considers the religious diversity in our society.177 Reli
gious texts also provide an improper basis for contesting the views
172. See Note, supra note 10, at 1268-69 ("A proper respect for the value of individual
identity underlying the free exercise clause should empower an individual with the right to
originate religious claims as an expression of moral independence. This power encompasses
the right to form, express, and revise religious conceptions. Objective determinations of reli
gious burdens deviate from this vision because they undervalue the claims of atypical individ
uals - those who feel the weight of government intrusions differently and who adhere to
certain religious practices more stringently than others. Because religious beliefs are so
individualistic, free exercise jurisprudence must consider each person's particular conception
of religious obligations and how they may be fulfilled. Individuals, even among those belong
ing to the same faith, may attribute varying degrees of sacredness to religious tenets." (cita
tions omitted)).
173. See Id. at 1266.
174. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
175. See 450 U.S. at 715.
176. 450 U.S. at 715. This conclusion also seems to follow from the holding in Frazee. If
a person need not be a member of a religious organization to enjoy the benefit of the Free
Exercise Clause, then it stands to reason that the believer also need not conform to the views
of other believers to share in the right to religious freedom. See Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of
Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) ("(W]e reject the notion that to claim the protec
tion of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular
religious organization."); see also Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to
contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?");
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696 (1986) (addressing the petitioner's unique views regarding
social security cards without considering the religious beliefs of other members of the
Abeneki tribe).
177. Indeed, efforts to establish objective guidelines for what constitutes a "central" or
"compelled" practice may violate constitutional boundaries. See Lupu, supra note 10, at 959
("The idea [of centrality] cannot be employed without judicial standards concerning the
meaning and significance of religious behavior, teachings, and phenomena. Any attempt to
declare such standards, however, runs the usual and grave risk of bias toward Western, mon
otheistic religions . . . .").
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of a claimant, given that scripture is susceptible to different inter
pretations.178 The claimant's history of engaging in the practice is
also of questionable value, given the possibility of sincere religious
conversions.179 Indeed, it appears that there is no source of author
ity by which to determine whether a particular practice is central or
compelled, apart from the expressed views of the individual claim
ant. Without an external locus of authority, courts lack the capacity
to decide whether the practice is, in fact, central or compelled.180
In contrast, courts are eminently capable of applying the reli
gious motivation test. This standard requires courts to decide
whether a practice is motivated by sincere religious beliefs.181
Courts are routinely called upon to make determinations of motiva
tion in other areas of law.182 Issues often arise about a party's moti
vations, and the legal system presumes that courts are able to
resolve such issues.183 By focusing on an inquiry that is frequently
178. The sheer number of Christian denominations, for example, attests to the fact that
followers of a common faith interpret scripture differently. A court cannot reject a RFRA
claim based upon a passage of scripture, because the individual may accept a different under
standing of the text, or may even reject the authority of a given passage of scripture entirely.
In any event, courts lack the authority to interpret religious texts, and cannot require a claim
ant to accept an "orthodox" interpretation of scripture. For a discussion of Establishment
Clause concerns, see infra section IV.B.
179. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comrnn. of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987)
("In effect, the Appeals Commission asks us to single out the religious convert for different,
less favorable treatment than that given an individual whose adherence to his or her faith
precedes employment. We decline to do so.").
180. At a more basic level, even if a court could determine whether the practice was
central or compelled, religious practices that are not central or compelled are no less deserv
ing of protection. Such practices form a valuable part of a believer's religious experience,
and ought to receive protection irrespective of the theological views of the claimant. Inter
estingly enough, courts that adopt the centrality and compulsion tests fail to offer a rationale
for leaving such practices vulnerable to state interference.
181. Granted, deciding whether a particular claimant is "sincere," and resolving whether
a particular practice is "religious," are problematic inquiries. Such difficulties, however, are
not unique to the motivation test. Under any of the three competing interpretations of the
RFRA, courts must decide that the claimant is sincere, and that the conduct in question is, in
fact, religious in nature. For a discussion of what constitutes a religion under the First
Amendment and the RFRA, see sources cited supra note 20. For a discussion of the sincerity
requirement, see TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1248-51.
182. See, e.g., Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981 (1994) (protecting the civil rights of victims of gender-motivated violence); Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (allowing punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if an im
proper intent motivated the defendant's actions); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (scrutinizing the motivations of policymakers under
the Equal Protection Clause); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3rd Cir. 1995)
(observing that the federal in forma pauperis statute requires courts to "engage in a subjec
tive inquiry into the litigant's motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit to determine
whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure or harass the defendant").
183. See Rouser v. White, 944 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 (E.D. Cal. 1996) ("[P]roving a requisite
motive or mental state is hardly an unknown burden on plaintiffs. . . . The law frequently
requires proof of a state of mind, and the fact that such proof is always circumstantial has not
constituted an insurmountable barrier to conviction for specific intent crimes, or liability for
malicious conduct. The issue [of religious motivation] is similar and should prove no more
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raised in other legal disputes, the motivation standard allows courts
to stay within the bounds of their judicial capacities.184
B.

The Limits of Judicial Authority

In addition, the centrality test and the compulsion test violate
the Constitution by requiring courts to resolve theological dis
putes.185 Courts cannot decide whether a practice is central to or
compelled by a litigant's religion without making a theological in
terpretation of the believer's faith. Courts exceed constitutional
boundaries when they willingly engage in such doctrinal
decisionmaking.
The centrality and compulsion tests require courts to make judg
ments about theological issues, as illustrated by the case of
Rhinehart v. Gomez.186 The plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner, objected
to a required tuberculosis ("TB") test on religious grounds. After
the prison officials forcibly administered the test, the plaintiff filed
suit under the RFRA.
Applying a hybrid test that considered both centrality and com
pulsion, the court found no substantial burden on the plaintiff's reli
gion.187 The court justified its conclusion by appealing to the views
of other followers of Islam. The court accepted the testimony of a
local Muslim chaplain, who expressed the opinion that TB testing is
consistent with the Islamic faith. The court also drew attention to
the plaintiff's inability to cite Muslim authorities who shared his
religious beliefs.188 After noting that other courts had approved the
TB testing of Muslim inmates,189 the court concluded that the pris
oner had failed to establish that TB testing "substantially burdifficult than in those other instances." (construing the substantial burden requirement of the
RFRA)).
184. For a brief discussion of how to establish religious motive, see Rouser, 944 F. Supp.
at 1455 n.14.
185. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he decisive argument in
favor of the generous definition of 'substantial burden,' it seems to us, is the undesirability of
making judges arbiters of religious law, as required by the alternative approach[es]." (cita·
tions omitted)).
186. No. 93-CV-3747, 1995 WL 364339 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 1995).
187. See Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339. Even if the Court had found a cognizable burden
on the claimant's religion, the state might have been able to justify the TB testing under the
compelling state interest test.
188. See Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339, at *5.
189. See Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339, at *5. The fact that other Muslim inmates had ob
jected to TB tests casts into doubt the court's conclusion that the Muslim faith provides no
basis for such objections. Again, the subjective religious views of other members of the
plaintiff's faith ought not to have been considered at all. Yet, it is curious that a court would
consider external evidence and then overlook the pattern of objections to TB testing brought
by Muslim prisoners in other cases.
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den[ed) his ability to exercise an essential element of his
religion."190
Viewing a "substantial burden" in terms of central beliefs and
religious compulsion, the court in Rhinehart entered the "thicket of
theology. "191 Embroiled in the middle of a doctrinal dispute, the
court threw the power of the state behind one party's interpretation
of the Islamic faith. In essence, the court endorsed the chaplain's
view as the "orthodox" Islamic perspective, while repudiating the
theological convictions of the plaintiff as an aberrant interpretation
of a common faith. Such theological involvement by a state offi
cial-an inevitable consequence of both the centrality test and the
compulsion test-is inconsistent with a long line of cases that for
bids courts from deciding questions of religious doctrine.192
Beginning with the seminal case of Watson v. Jones, 193 the Court
has steadfastly refused to make judgments regarding theological is
sues. "In this country the full and free right to entertain any reli
gious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any
religious doctrine . . . is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of
no sect. "194
Subsequent cases reinforced the rule that judges may not take
sides in a theological controversy.195 In short, " [c]ourts are not ar190. Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339, at *5 (emphasis added).
191. The phrase is from Lupu, supra note 10, at 959.
192. See id. at 959 ("[A]ny imaginable process for resolving disputes over centrality cre
ates the spectre of religious experts giving conflicting testimony about the significance of a
religious practice, with the state's decisionmaker authoritatively choosing among them. A
hoary and well-respected line of cases . . . strongly suggests that judicial resolution of theolog
ical controversy is both beyond judicial competence and out of constitutional bounds."); see
also TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1244 ("[A]n intrusive government inquiry into the na
ture of a claimant's beliefs would in itself threaten the values of religious liberty."); Berg,
supra note 23, at 51-56 ("Unfortunately, it is often difficult for courts to calibrate effects on
religious practice, because an important part of that calculus - how important is the practice
to the believer or church? - is essentially a theological question beyond the competence or
authority of judges. . . . [T)he 'command or prohibition' limit itself suffers from the same
defect as did the Court's previous inquiries into the 'centrality' or 'importance' of a practice.
It improperly requires courts to make 'theological' judgments about whether the particular
conduct is religiously mandated or just religiously motivated." (citations omitted)); Lupu,
supra note 166, at 406-07 ("[T)he constitutional evil to be avoided in all cases is judicial
resolution of questions of religious doctrine and practice. . . .").
193. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
194. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728. Watson involved a dispute over church property. The
Court !Iatly rejected the invitation to decide which party followed the principles of the Pres
byterian Church. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29.
195. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 887 (1990) ("Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unaccept
able 'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.' . . . Repeatedly
and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine
the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim." (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))); Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is not within the judicial ken to question the
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biters of scriptural interpretation." 1 96 Adopting one party's view of
"centrality" or "compulsion" would violate both the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment: it would
amount to a state sanction of one set of religious beliefs, and also
would deprive the losing party of the right to exercise religion with
out governmental interference.1 97 "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion . . . ."1 9 8
Simply put, judges should not be permitted to dissect religious
doctrine and determine the theological significance of a claimant's
exercise of religion. The compulsion test and the centrality test re
quire courts to transgress this limitation - courts must offer a de
finitive interpretation of religious doctrine whenever there is a
dispute about whether a given practice is central or compelled.
Such unsavory inquiries violate the rights of the individual believers
and undermine the traditional prohibition against a judicial resolu
tion of theological disputes.
In contrast, the religious motivation test allows courts to avoid
such unpalatable inquiries. This standard requires courts to decide
whether a practice is principally motivated by religious belief.
Once a claimant demonstrates religious motivation, the court has
no opportunity for further inquiries into the role of the practice
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants'
interpretations of those creeds."); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to
inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands
of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."); Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) ("Most importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from
resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice."); Serbian
E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)
("[R]eligious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry . . . . "); Maryland
and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Bren
nan, J., concurring) (stating that courts must resolve religious disputes "without the resolu
tion of doctrinal questions and without extensive inquiry into religious polity"); Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Meml. Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment forbids courts from deciding "mat
ters at the very c9re of a religion - the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to the religion"); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian
Orthodox Church in N.A., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (affirming the power of religious bodies
"to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well
as those of faith and doctrine"); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981)
(noting that the judiciary is "ill-equipped to examine the breadth and content of an avowed
religion").
196. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
197. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.12, at
1242 (4th ed. 1991) ("[T]he government cannot declare which party is correct in matters of
religion, for that would violate the principles of both religion clauses. A judicial declaration
of such matters would simultaneously establish one religious view as correct for the organiza
tion while inhibiting the free exercise of the opposing belief.").
198. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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within the claimant's faith. The religious motivation test thus main
tains :fidelity to the Constitution by avoiding the "treacherous busi
ness" 199 of deciding the place of a religious practice in the lives of
devout individuals.
CONCLUSION

Smith concluded that religious individuals must look to the
political branches, and not to the Constitution, for protection from
generally applicable laws that encroach upon religion. The political
branches, in tum, soundly repudiated Smith and reinstated the
compelling state interest test through the RFRA.
With broad remedial designs, Congress intended for the Reli
gious Freedom Restoration Act to provide a bulwark of protection
for religious liberty. Many courts, however, have failed to remain
faithful to the laudable goals of the statute. Narrow interpretations
of the substantial burden requirement undermine the ultimate pur
pose of the Act: to secure the inalienable right to the free exercise
of religion.
The religious motivation test conforms with the sweeping lan
guage of the RFRA, with the intent of Congress as revealed in the
legislative history, and with the directives of the Court in the pre
Smith case law. The motivation standard protects the exercise of
religion without excluding any religious practice or religious group.
This standard shows respect for the limitations placed upon the ju
diciary, and does not put courts in the position of resolving theolog
ical disputes. In short, the religious motivation test provides the
best avenue for enhancing protection for the exercise of religion.
As Representative Solarz observed during consideration of the
bill: "It would be tragic if the effort to overturn Smith resulted in
Congressional inquisitions into, and determinations of, the content
of religious law, or a narrow statutory definition of what is a 'reli
gion' or a religious 'exercise.' "20° It would be equally tragic if
courts continued their inquisitions into religious law by limiting the
RFRA to central and compelled practices.

199. See TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1251 (noting that courts are "engaged in a
treacherous business indeed when they try to assess the place that religion occupies in a
person's life").
200. Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 130 (letter from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Don
Edwards (June 22, 1992)).

